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Abstract of thesis entitled: 
IP Traceback Marking Scheme Based DDoS Defense 
Submitted by Ping Yan 
for the degree of Master of Philosophy 
at The Chinese University of Hong Kong in December 2004 
This thesis presents an effective means to defend against DDoS attacks 
by first locating the actual attack source (s) and then removing the 
attack traffic. 
The proposed adaptive packet marking scheme for IP traceback 
supports two types of marking: router id marking and probabilistic 
domain id marking. After collecting sufficient packets, the victim re-
constructs the attack graph, with each node in the graph viewed as a 
domain. Meanwhile, based on the reconstructed attack graph, we de-
fend against DoS attacks with two alternative schemes: packet filtering 
at victim-end and attack traffic rate-limiting at the sources. At the 
victim side, we propose to let a number of filtering agents inspect the 
markings inscribed in the received packets and filter the attack packets 
according to the attack signatures. At the side of attack sources, we 
propose to inform the detected source domains to rate-limit the attack 
traffic. 
The simulation results show that the proposed IP traceback scheme 
outperforms other IP traceback methods as it requires fewer packets 
i 
for attack paths reconstruction, and can handle large number of attack 
sources effectively; the success rate of attack sources identification is 
high and the false positives produced are relatively low. Further, it does 
not generate additional traffic. The packet filtering mechanism can 
remove around 80% attack traffic. With the source-end rate-limiting 
system, the throughput of legitimate traffic is significantly improved 
from 10% to 90%. Therefore, the throughput of legitimate traffic could 
be significantly improved, so that the DDoS attacks could be ultimately 
thwarted. . 
Keywords: DDoS attacks, DDoS defenses, IP traceback, proba-
bilistic packets marking, inter-domain marking, source router marking, 
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1.1 The Problem 
Denial of service (DoS) attacks (as shown in Fig. 1.1) — and more 
commonly observed, the distributed ones (DDoS) attacks (as shown 
in Fig. 1.2) — have become a major threat to the stability of the 
Internet. Since the several high-profile Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attacks launched on Yahoo! [9], eBay and Amazon.com in 
2000，DDoS attack technologies have continued to evolve and continues 
to be used to impair Internet infrastructures [3] [31 . 
The first obvious consequence of DDoS attack is service disruption, 
and not only a majority of Internet users are annoyed by the failures of 
Internet service access, but also the commercial entities on the Internet 
are suffering from the bad publicity and possible loss of customers [12 . 
A real-time online transaction may directly suffer money loss due to 
service disruption caused by a DDoS attack. Computer Economics [11 
estimated that the total economic impact of Code Red was $2.6 billion, 
and Sir cam cost another $1.3 billion. A recent attack via SQL Slammer 
1 
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caused an estimated $1 billion in damage during the first five days as it 
rapidly spread around the globe [36]. A 2003 CSI/FBI computer crime 
k security survey reveals 55% of respondents reported DoS attacks 
with $65 million loss. Even worse, DDoS attacks are quite simple to 
commit. Quite a lot of tools and malicious source codes are available 
on the Internet. The well-known ones include TFN2K, Stacheldraht 
and TrinOO as relatively old version. Therefore, dealing with DDoS is 
a major security concern of the Internet. 
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Figure 1.1: Denial of Service attack. 
Although great efforts has been involved in attack detection and 
prevention, there is still a lack of effective and efficient solutions to 
intercept ongoing attack in a timely fashion. 
However, because of the anonymous nature of Internet, the attack-
ers can arbitrarily spoof the source IP addresses in the attack packets. 
The attacker will use a forged IP address in the malicious packets, 
which is addressed as IP Spoofing. First, this can avoid being traced 
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Figure 1.2: Distributed Denial of Service attack. 
back and possible law punishment, and second, the source addresses 
being scattered across a large amount of different spoofed addresses 
makes some detection tools fail to identify the traffic anomalies. IP 
spoofing [16] is a quite simple technique prevailing in MITM (Man In 
the Middle) attacks, DoS attacks and other most network crimes. In 
such instances, conventional methods of determining the location of 
the system with a given IP address on the Internet (e.g., traceroute) 
no longer work because the source address used for tracing can be 
spoofed. Therefore, more advanced methods of identifying the source 
of attacking packets are needed. 
1.2 Research Motivations and Objectives 
The most primary practice against IP spoofing [26] is IP traceback, 
which aims to find the actual sources of the attack, where we define 
the source as the router directly connected to the system from which 
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the flow of packets, constituting the attack, was initiated [20] [16]. IP 
traceback approaches are for the destination under attack to recon-
struct the full paths traversed by the attack packets, so as to identify 
the origin(s) of the attack traffic. 
IP traceback approaches are extensively proposed in the literature. 
Savage et al. [45] proposed to let each router probabilistically inscribe 
a piece of partial path information in the IP header of the packet it 
forwards. In the phase of attack paths reconstruction, the pieces of 
traceback information extracted from received packets will be put to-
gether hop by hop from near the victim. In the ICMP message trace-
back scheme [19], Bellovin proposed to write the traceback information 
in a separate ICMP message. In Advanced and Authenticated Marking 
Schemes (AMS), Song and Perrig [49] proposed to hash the traceback 
message to fit in the relatively short marking field instead of fragment-
ing these router messages. They also proposed an authenticated mark-
ing scheme using a 5 bits Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) 
34] appending on the marked message. However, it seems unpractical 
due to the daunting computation overhead. 
All these solutions represent certain effectiveness on solving the IP 
traceback problem. However, they also show weakness in different ways 
or show certain incapability to trace back the attackers efficiently for 
large scale DDoS attacks. For instance, the proposed probabilistic 
packet marking schemes or ICMP traceback messages schemes rely on 
observing a high volume of spoofed traffic comprised of thousands or 
millions of packets, so the attacker can undermine the traceback by 
spreading the attack traffic across many attacking hosts (also referred 
to as agents, slaves, or reflectors in a reflector DDoS attack [21]), greatly 
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increasing the amount of time required by the traceback scheme to 
gather sufficient packets to analyze. Therefore, an effective traceback 
scheme should use as few packets as possible to reveal an attack path. 
In addition, some people are challenging the necessity of the full-
path traceback solution [17]; identifying all the intermediate routers 
that the attack packets traversed, may be unattractive to the victims 
and ineffective for DoS (DDoS) countermeasures. First, the full-path 
traceback is as good as the address of an ingress point in terms of 
identifying the attacker. Second, each packet in a datagram network 
is individually routed so packets may take different routes even if their 
source and destination are identical. Third, the addressing within ISPs' 
networks is not necessarily understandable to the public since ISP may 
use private addressing plans within their own networks [17]. Therefore, 
we propose a domain based IP packet marking scheme to identify the 
intermediate domains instead of the individual routers, except the one 
serving as the attack source. 
Therefore, one of this research's objectives is to extensively discuss 
how our IP traceback proposal addresses the problems with the existing 
solutions. The proposed packet marking scheme is intended to serve 
as an IP traceback scheme effective in the common performance met-
rics for IP Traceback schemes, namely, Minimum Number of Packets, 
Computation Overhead, Robustness and Deployment Overhead[35 . 
In addition to the packet marking scheme for IP traceback which 
is used to solve the IP traceback problem, we propose two alternative 
attack traffic regulation schemes to protect the victim under the DDoS 
attacks. 
In general, IP traceback and attack source identification has limited 
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capability of defending against DDoS attacks with regard to helping 
mitigation of DDoS attack traffic and guaranteeing the service avail-
ability [15]. First, current IP traceback solutions are not always able 
to trace packets' origins (e.g., those behind firewalls and NAT (net-
work address translators). Second, even if the attack sources can be 
identified successfully, it is a rather difficult task to stop them at the 
sources, especially when they are scattered in various AS's. It is of no 
help on preserving the service availability by IP traceback techniques 
alone. While what concerns the network security community is how 
to defend against DDoS attacks, reducing the damages caused by such 
notorious attacks. 
There are quite a number of measures that are used to either prevent 
the happening of DoS/DDoS attacks or mitigate the effect of it. They 
may need the modification of the Internet infrastructure or configura-
tion of the network elements and some need to call for cooperation of 
network operators. 
Ingress/Egress filtering [27] and DPF (route-based Distributed Packet 
Filtering) technique [41] are two distributed filtering techniques rely-
ing on the Internet-wide deployment. They are used to detect those 
messages with invalid sources and discard them. However, it is still 
a question whether this “ global security" would be practical in the 
near future since they require global cooperation; furthermore, mes-
sages whose claimed sources are modified between adjacent routers in 
the middle of the network will not be detected by ingress filtering. 
A second category of techniques is defenses right before victim; con-
gestion control based mechanisms are such representatives. As most 
DDoS attacks incur network congestion while flooding the victims by 
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large traffic, a congestion control mechanism should help alleviate the 
resources consumption suffered by legitimate traffic. Random Early 
Detect (RED) [28] is an approach to identify and preferentially drop 
the flows that do not obey TCP-friendly end-toend congestion con-
trol. Some other works, such as Fair Queueing [25] and Class-Based 
Queueing [29] try to allocate certain available bandwidth to each flow 
so that they can be all served. The drawback with these methods is 
that packets or flows are unidentifiable concerning whether they are 
attack traffic or legitimate traffic. 
J. loannidis and S. M. Bellovin proposed an approach of the Push-
back mechanism [33]. The main drawback with the hop-by-hop trac-
ing methods is that, in large-scale DDoS attacks, they have limited 
capabilities to separate the legitimate packets from attack packets in a 
pattern-based way. At the same time, some researchers propose that 
DDoS attacks should be stopped as close to the sources as possible. In 
the work of Jelena Mirkovioc et al. [1] a DDoS defense system called 
D-WARD is proposed, which is deployed at the source-end networks 
(stub networks or ISP networks) and prevents the machines from par-
ticipating in DDoS attacks. However this approach requires that many 
routers at different network entry points each independently run the 
system, since each D-WARD router only polices data flows originating 
from its own network. Further more, the DDoS defense capability is 
confined by the limited attack traffic detection. 
Therefore, the other objective is to remove the attack traffic to 
defend against the DDoS attacks; addressing the problems discussed 
above meanwhile. We would propose a method leveraging on the IP 
traceback, with attack sources identified. 
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1.3 The Rationale 
Our proposed DDoS attacks defense mechanism involves first finding 
the attack sources and then using the attack signatures to perform 
packets filtering at the victim end or rate-limiting at the source end. 
The IP traceback scheme keeps track of the intermediate domains 
instead of what routers a packet has traversed within a domain and 
identifies the source routers serving as ingress points of attack traffic 
at the same time. As the proposed marking scheme needs only a small 
number of packets to reconstruct the attach graph, it facilitates s a 
real time practice of stopping the on-going DDoS attacks, which is the 
focus of this work. • 
The packets filtering process take place on participating routers 
located around the potential victims (routers are supposed to have 
been equipped with tools for packet filtering. Netfilter, iptable are such 
available tools implemented due to different router OS). First, the IP 
Traceback mechanism is used to reconstruct the attack graph with the 
collected marked packets from the attacking sources or other sources 
whatsoever. The reconstructed attack graph is encoded as signature 
bitmaps, consisting of markings of detected source routers or domains 
on attack paths. The signature bitmaps would be sent to the filtering 
agents, and by inspecting each received packet, the filtering agents 
would catch an attack packet whose marking match with a filtering 
signature and drop it with certain probability. 
However, we note that not all attack packets could be removed at 
the victim-end. And the network bandwidth is not protected since at-
tack traffic still marches the whole way till near the victim. Therefore, 
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we propose to let source routers identified by the underlying IP trace-
back scheme rate-limit the attack traffic from the sources. The traffic 
limiting rates are calculated such that the bandwidth of the victim is 
well utilized, thus the throughput of legitimate traffic is optimized. 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
This research examines in details a practical DDoS defense approach 
based on a packet marking scheme for IP traceback. Chapter 2 sur-
veys the previous works on DDoS defense problem and addresses the 
problems with the existing solutions. Chapter 3 extensively presents 
the proposed IP traceback scheme and states about the effectiveness 
of this method, which is quite related to the effectiveness of the overall 
performance of the defenses scheme. In the fourth chapter, we would 
articulate the operation of the packet filtering mechanism and source-
end rate-limiting system and present simulation results. Chapter 5 
concludes our research work, listing the contributions of our work and 
discussing future work. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 2 
BACKGROUND STUDY 
In this chapter, we present a detailed and formal definition of Dis-
tributed Denial of Service Attacks and IP traceback problem. We 
would also highlight the desired features of an IP traceback system 
23]. we would survey the previous works on DDoS defense problem 
and discuss the problems with the existing solutions [57 . 
2.1 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks 
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack is characterized by an explicit attempt 
by an attacker to prevent legitimate users of a service from using the 
desired resources [32]. Examples of denial of service attacks include: 
• attempts to "flood" a network, thereby preventing legitimate net-
work traffic 
• attempts to disrupt connections between two machines, thereby 
preventing access to a service 
• attempts to prevent a particular individual from accessing a ser-
10 
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vice 
• attempts to disrupt service to a specific system or person. 
In a distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack, the attacker com-
promises a number of daemons and installs flooding servers on them, 
later contacting the set of servers to combine their transmission power 
in an orchestrated flooding attack. The distributed format adds the 
"many to one" dimension that makes these attacks more difficult to 
prevent [37]. The use of a large number of daemons both augments the 
power of the attack and complicates defending against it: the dilution 
of locality in the flooding stream makes it more difficult for the victim 
to isolate the attack traffic in order to block it, and also undermines the 
potential effectiveness of traceback techniques for locating the source 
of streams of packets with spoofed source addresses. 
A distributed denial of service attack is composed of four elements, 
as shown in Fig. 2.1. 
• First, it involves a victim, i.e., the target host that has been chosen 
to receive the brunt of the attack. 
• Second, it involves the presence of the attack daemon agents. 
These are agent programs that actually conduct the attack on 
the target victim. Attack daemons are usually deployed in host 
computers. These daemons affect both the target and the host 
computers. 
• The third component of a distributed denial of service attack is 
the control master program. Its task is to coordinate the attack. 
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Figure 2.1: Architecture of a distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack. 
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• Finally, there is the real attacker, the mastermind behind the 
attack. By using a control master program, the real attacker can 
stay behind the scenes of the attack. 
The following steps take place during a distributed DoS attack: 
1. The real attacker sends an "execute" message to the control mas-
ter program. 
2. The control master program receives the "execute" message and 
propagates the command to the attack daemons under its control. 
3. Upon receiving the attack command, the attack daemons begin 
the attack on the victim. 
2.1.1 Taxonomy of DoS and DDoS Attacks 
In the following text, we review some well-known attack methods: 
Smurf, SYN Flood, and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) Flood and 
the current distributed denial of service methods: Trinoo, Tribe Flood 
Network, Stacheldraht, Shaft and TFN2K. 
Smurf Attack - When a perpetrator sends a large number of ICMP 
echo (ping) traffic at IP broadcast addresses, using a fake source ad-
dress. The source address will be flooded with simultaneous replies 
(See CERT Advisory: CA-1998-01 [2]). 
Smurf attack involves an attacker sending a large amount of Inter-
net Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo traffic to a set of Internet 
Protocol (IP) broadcast addresses. The ICMP echo packets are speci-
fied with a source address of the target victim (spoofed address). Most 
hosts on an IP network will accept ICMP echo requests and reply to 
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them with an echo reply to the source address, in this case, the target 
victim. This multiplies the traffic by the number of responding hosts. 
On a broadcast network, there could potentially be hundreds of ma-
chines to reply to each ICMP packet. The process of using a network 
to elicit many responses to a single packet has been labeled as an "am-
plifier" . T h e r e are two parties who are hurt by this type of attack: 
the intermediate broadcast devices (amplifiers) and the spoofed source 
address target (the victim). The victim is the target of a large amount 
of traffic that the amplifiers generate. This attack has the potential to 
overload an entire network. 
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) Flood [1] - When a connec-
tion is established between two UDP services, each of which produces 
output, these two services can produce a very high number of packets 
that can lead to a denial of service on the machine(s) where the services 
are offered. Anyone with network connectivity can launch an attack; 
no account access is needed. 
For example, by connecting a host's chargen service to the echo 
service on the same or another machine, all affected machines may be 
effectively taken out of service because of the excessively high number 
of packets produced. In addition, if two or more hosts are so connected, 
the intervening network may also become congested and deny service 
to all hosts whose traffic traverses that network. 
SYN Attack - When an attacker sends a series of SYN requests to a 
target (victim). The target sends a SYN/ACK in response and waits for 
an ACK to come back to complete the session set up. Since the source 
address was fake, the response never comes, filling the victim's memory 
buffers so that it can no longer accept legitimate session requests. 
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SYN Flooding attack is also known as the Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) SYN attack, and is based on exploiting the standard 
TCP three-way handshake. The TCP three-way handshake requires 
a three-packet exchange to be performed before a client can officially 
use the service. A server, upon receiving an initial SYN (synchro-
nize/start) request from a client, sends back a SYN/ACK (synchro-
nize/ acknowledge) packet and waits for the client to send the final 
ACK (acknowledge). However, it is possible to send a barrage of initial 
SYN's without sending the corresponding ACK's, essentially leaving 
the server waiting for the non-existent ACK's. Considering that the 
server only has a limited buffer queue for new connections, SYN Flood 
results in the server being unable to process other incoming connections 
as the queue gets overloaded. 
In the following text, we describe the distributed denial of service 
methods employed by an attacker. These techniques help an attacker 
coordinate and execute the attack. These types of attacks plagued 
the Internet in February 2000. However, these distributed attack tech-
niques still rely on the previously described attack methods to carry out 
the attacks. The techniques are listed in chronological order. It can be 
observed that as time has passed, the distributed techniques: Trinoo, 
TFN, Stacheldraht, Shaft, and TFN2K have become technically more 
advanced and, hence, more difficult to detect. 
Trinoo uses TCP to communicate between the attacker and the 
control master program. The master program communicates with the 
attack daemons using UDP packets. Trinoo's attack daemons imple-
ment UDP Flood attacks against the target victim [4 . 
Tribe Flood Network ( T F N ) uses a command line interface to 
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communicate between the attacker and the control master program. 
Communication between the control master and attack daemons is 
done via ICMP echo reply packets. TFN's attack daemons implement 
Smurf, SYN Flood, UDP Flood, and ICMP Flood attacks [6:. 
Stacheldraht(German term for "barbed wire") is based on the 
TFN attack. However, unlike TFN, Stacheldraht uses an encrypted 
TCP connection for communication between the attacker and master 
control program. Communication between the master control program 
and attack daemons is conducted using TCP and ICMP, and involves 
an automatic update technique for the attack daemons. The attack 
daemons for Stacheldraht implement Smurf, SYN Flood, UDP Flood, 
and ICMP Flood attacks [5.. 
Shaft is modeled after Trinoo. Communication between the control 
master program and attack daemons is achieved using UDP packets. 
The control master program and the attacker communicate via a simple 
TCP telnet connection. A distinctive feature of Shaft is the ability to 
switch control master servers and ports in real time, hence making 
detection by intrusion detection tools difficult [7 . 
TFN2K uses TCP, UDP, ICMP, or all three to communicate be-
tween the control master program and the attack daemons. Communi-
cation between the real attacker and control master is encrypted using 
a key-based CAST-256 algorithm [14]. In addition, TFN2K conducts 
covert exercises to hide itself from intrusion detection systems [8.. 
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2.2 IP Traceback 
Criminals have long employed the tactic of masking their true identity, 
from disguises to aliases. It should come as no surprise then, that crim-
inals who conduct their nefarious activities on networks and computers 
should employ such techniques. Due to the anonymous nature of the 
IP protocol, IP spoofing is prevailing in most different form DDoS at-
tacks. The network routing infrastructure is stateless and based largely 
on destination addresses; no entity in an IP network is officially re-
sponsible for ensuring the source address is correct. In IP spoofing, 
an attacker spoof the IP address, especially source IP address of his 
malicious message [54].: 
Relatively advanced spoofing beyond simple floods are used in very 
specific instances such as evasion and connection hijacking as well as 
network scanning and probes. The sequence and acknowledgement 
numbers are commonly manipulated in such instances, but we would 
focus on its presence in DDoS attacks in this work. Examining the IP 
header，two bytes among various other information about the packet 
contains the source and destination IP addresses. Using one of sev-
eral tools, an attacker can easily modify these addresses — specifically 
the "source address" field. In order to prolong the effectiveness of the 
attack, they spoof source IP addresses to make tracing and stopping 
the DoS as difficult as possible. IP spoofing is almost always used in 
denial of service attacks. Since crackers are concerned only with con-
suming bandwidth and resources, they need not worry about properly 
completing handshakes and transactions. Rather, they wish to flood 
the victim with as many packets as possible in a short amount of time. 
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When multiple compromised hosts are participating in the attack, all 
sending spoofed traffic, it is very challenging to quickly block traffic. 
Being unable to accurately identify the true source of an IP data-
gram if the source wishes to conceal it is the primary difficulty in deal-
ing with such attacks. Therefore, we are interested in finding out the 
origins of the attack packets. The accountability of DDoS attacks also 
require the accurate identification of attacking sources. 
The ability to trace back the source of a particular IP packet is 
what we want by IP lYaceback [22]. We would define IP traceback by 
describing the assumptions an IP traceback system must carry and its 
model. 
2.2.1 Assumptions 
There are several important assumptions that a traceback system should 
make about a network and the traffic it carries [48 . 
• Packets may be addressed to more than one physical host. IP 
packets may contain a multicast or broadcast address as their 
destination. 
• Duplicate packets may exist in the network. An attacker can 
inject multiple identical packets itself, possibly at multiple loca-
tions. 
• Routers may be subverted, but not often. An attacker may gain 
access to routers along (or adjacent to) the path from attacker to 
victim by a variety of means. 
• Attackers are aware they are being traced. A sophisticated at-
tacker is aware of the characteristics of the network, including 
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the possibility that the network is capable of tracing an attack. 
• The routing behavior of the network may be unstable. Two pack-
ets sent by the same host to the same destination may traverse 
wildly different paths. 
• The packet size should not grow as a result of tracing. It is a 
main cause of fragmentation on the Internet. 
• End hosts may be resource constrained. We assume that an end 
host, and in particular the victim of an attack, may be resource 
poor and unable to maintain substantial additional administrative 
state regarding the routing state or the packets it has previously 
received. 
• Traceback is an infrequent operation. 
The first two assumptions are simply characteristics of the Internet 
Protocol. A tracing system must be prepared for a situation where 
there are multiple sources of the same (identical) packet, or a single 
source of multiple (also typically identical) packets. The next two as-
sumptions speak to the capabilities of the attacker(s). The traceback 
system must not be confounded by a motivated attacker who subverts 
a router with the intent to subvert the tracing system. The instability 
of Internet routing is well known [42] and its implications for tracing 
are important. As a result, any system that seeks to determine origins 
using multipacket analysis techniques must be prepared to make sense 
of divergent path information. The final assumption that traceback 
queries are infrequent has important design implications. It implies 
queries can be handled by a router's control path, and need not be 
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dealt with on the forwarding path at line speed. While there may be 
auditing tasks associated with packet forwarding to support traceback 
that must be executed while forwarding, the processing of the audit 
trails is infrequent with respect to their generation. 
The above assumptions are largely borrowed from the article of 
Savage on IP traceback. One assumption related to deployment issue 
with IP traceback schemes we need to clarify is that an IP traceback 
scheme is viewed as effective if it works without problem for the net-
works that participate, which means, we do not make universal deploy-
ment assumption for IP traceback schemes. If a network (or router, in 
the context of router-based traceback) does not participate, obviously, 
whether the non-participating network is on the attack path can not 
be identified by the IP traceback schemes. 
2.2.2 Problem Model and Performance Metrics 
In order to remain consistent with the terminology in the literature, we 
will consider a packet of interest to be nefarious, and term it an attack 
packet] similarly, the destination of the packet is the victim. Ideally, 
a traceback system should be able to identify the source of any piece 
of data sent across the network. As with any other auditing system, a 
traceback system can only be effective in networks in which it has been 
deployed [43]. Hence, we consider the source of a packet to be one of 
the following: 
• the ingress point to the traceback-enabled network; 
• the actual host or network of origin; 
• one or more compromised routers within the enabled network. 
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target 
Figure 2.2: IP traceback. 
In the literature, DDOS attacks are commonly considered as an 
attack propagating in a tree T, where the root of the tree T is the 
victim, V, each internal node in T corresponds to a router X on the 
Internet, and each leaf in T is an (possibly compromised) attack host 
30]. Thus, T is a subtree of the Internet, where we are modeling only 
the inflow of packets to V. In fact, from the perspective of V，the tree 
T is a subtree of a much larger universal tree U that consists of the 
union of all routes to V in the Internet. For any internal node X in T, 
other than the root, we therefore sometimes refer to the parent of X as 
X's downstream neighbor. Likewise, the children of a node X in T are 
sometimes called X's upstream neighbors. 
Our goal in the traceback problem is to identify the internal nodes 
of the tree T. That is, we wish to identify the internal nodes in the 
universal tree U that correspond to routers unwittingly serving in the 
attack tree T to send attack packets to the victim V. In addition, we 
specifically want to exclude from T any routers that are not part of 
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the attack. Moreover, so as to traceback large-scale DDoS attacks, we 
desire solutions that allow for efficient traceback even if T contains 
hundreds of routers. 
In a largely similar way, we would model the attack with a num-
ber of coordinated attackers attacking a single victim as an undirected 
graph with each node representing a domain (See Fig. 2.2). Domain 
is a logical subnet^on the Internet; a campus or internal corporate net-
work is an example of a domain. Data exchange between campus and 
corporate domains is facilitated by one or more ISP domains,, which of-
fer, as a service, transmission and switching facilities for data exchange 
between their customers. The IP packets thus flow though different net-
work domains, from regional ISP network to international ISP network 
and finally get to the destination. In general, to model the attack, a 
network domain can be thought of as a cloud, which connects to other 
domains at the peering points, with clients attaching on border routers. 
In our solution, the reconstructed attack graph would incorporate at-
tack paths and the source router(s) identified, with each node on the 
paths can be viewed as a domain. Note that, Each internal node X in 
our attack model is a domain instead of a router, the leaf nodes still 
representing attack host (possibly compromised ones) though. 
In the literature, the performance of IP traceback approaches is 
commonly measured by several parameters, namely, Minimum Num-
ber of Packets, Computation Overhead, Robustness and Deployment 
Overhead [35 . 
1 Subnet is a portion of a network, which may be a physically independent network 
segment, which shares a network address with other portions of the network and is dis-
tinguished by a subnet number [55]. 
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• Minimum number of packets is the number of packets required 
for attack graph reconstruction; it is desired to be minimized to 
achieve a fast response to an attack and diminish the damage 
45] [35:. 
• Computation Overhead represents estimated time required for re-
constructing the path back to the attackers. An efficient traceback 
approach should feature a relatively low computation complexity 
and incremental deployment into the current Internet structure, 
at low cost [35 . 
• Robustness of an IP traceback method is evaluated by two char-
acteristics, namely number of false positives and number of false 
negatives. A false positive is a router that is actually not on an 
attack path but is reconstructed to an attack graph by a traceback 
mechanism, and a false negative is a router that is missed in the 
reconstructed attack graph [45] [35]. An IP traceback approach is 
said to be robust if it gives a relatively low rate of false positives 
and false negatives, and if the rate does not grow rapidly as the 
increase of number of attackers. 
• Deployment - We need to employ a number of routers on the 
Internet to implement the traceback mechanism. This parameter 
can not be measured or calculated directly but can be evaluated 
by means of common sense. 
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2.3 IP Traceback Proposals 
2.3.1 Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) 
Probabilistic packet marking was originally introduced by Savage et al. 
45]. In his approach (as known as Fragmentation Marking Scheme, or 
FMS), there are two phases namely marking procedure and reconstruc-
tion procedure. In the first phase, each router X performs, for each 
packet it processes, an information injection event that occurs with a 
set probability p (e.g., p = 1/20). The information injection involves 
using b bits in the IP header that are typically not used or changed by 
routers; 5 bits of this for a hop count, which helps their reconstruction 
algorithm. The remaining bits are used for message MX which is the 
identification information of that router. If that message is too big, 
they break it into fragments and use some bits of usable IP header to 
store a fragment offset and its data fragment. 
Their algorithm is quite interesting, as it introduces the packet 
marking framework, and does not require a priori knowledge of the 
universal internet topology. But their algorithm, unfortunately, is not 
practical for large distributed denial-of-service attacks. In particular, 
their algorithm for reconstructing a message MX from a router at dis-
tance d from the victim requires nj^  checksum tests, where rid is the 
number of routers in T at distance d from V and I is the number of 
fragments messages have been divided into (in most cases, 8 fragments 
are required). For example, if rid = 30 and I = 8, then the victim 
has to perform over 650 trillion checksum tests in order to reconstruct 
each of the 30 messages [33]. Such a computation is, of course, not 
feasible for the victim, and even if it were, it would introduce many 
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false positives. Potentially, the victim would have to perform searches 
of data structure consisting of billions of entries. 
The number of packets to be collected for reconstruction procedure 
is measured in thousands. In particular, because one IP address has to 
be fragmented and marked into a separate packet, they need 8 marked 
packets to represent one address pair, as proposed by Savage et al. In 
addition, due to the nature of probabilistic marking, the number of 
packets, X, required for the victim to reconstruct a path of length d 
has the following bounded expectation: 
称 R I ^ (2.1) 
In particular, ii p = 10%, and the attack path has a length of 10, 
then a victim can typically reconstruct this path after receiving 75 
packets from the attacker [45]. Moreover, this scheme is easily spoofed 
by an adversary that knows this algorithm. 
In Advanced and Authentication Marking Scheme (AMS), Song and 
Perrig [49] improve the performance of probabilistic packet marking 
and suggest the use of hash chains for authenticating routers. They 
also use a 5-bit distance field, but they do not fragment router mes-
sages. Instead, they assume the victim knows the universal tree U, 
so the full IP address is encoded into 11 bits hash values by two sets 
of universal random hash functions in the packet marking. To recon-
struct the attacking graph, the victim uses the upstream router map 
as a road-map and performs a breadth-first search from the root to 
identify the corresponding router which was encoded in the marking 
fields. 
Though assumption has to be made that the victim is aware of the 
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND STUDY 26 
network topology, the number of packets required for reconstruction 
can be decreased to 1000 packets. They also proposed an authentica-
tion marking scheme using a 5 bits Hash Message Authentication Code 
(HMAC) appending on the marked message. But the computation for 
HMAC seems not very practical, though the evasion of the scheme 
becomes difficult for the attackers. Why AMS is advantageous over 
FMS lies in that without the combinatorial computations of checksum 
tests, AMS can successfully deal with DDoS attack up to near thou-
sand attackers. With threshold m > 7 (where m is the number of 
hash functions are used in their scheme), AMS can be robust against 
DDoS with even 1500 distributed attacker sites and only has 20 false 
positives when there are 2000 attacker sites. But within a reasonable 
region, where the victim is satisfied by the furthest approximate sources 
it can reach, this scheme works with great accuracy and efficiency. 
2.3.2 ICMP Traceback Messaging 
An alternative approach, based on ICMP messaging, is to have each 
router R decide, with some probability q (typically, q = 1/20000 is 
mentioned), for each packet P to send an additional ICMP message 
packet to the destination. The message may contain several fields: 
Back link, which is information on the previous hop; Forward link, 
information on the next hop and Timestamp etc. [19]. So with enough 
Traceback messages from enough routers along the path, the traffic 
source and path can be determined. 
The main drawback of this approach is that it causes additional 
network traffic even when no DDOS is present. Even so, it is not 
efficient, for identifying all the n internal nodes in the attack tree T 
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND STUDY 27 
requires, a large even unacceptable number of attacking packets are 
required for the path reconstruction. For example, if the longest path 
length is 20 hops and there are about 1000 nodes on the reconstructed 
attack tree, the expected number of attack packets needing to arrive at 
the victim V before V will have sufficient information to reconstruct 
T i s 7.5 million [30:. 
Processing overhead is incurred at the destination during recon-
struction, Potentially, the victim has to perform searches of data struc-
tures consisting of thousands of entries. Reconstruction data structures 
will also require a large amount of memory. 
Bandwidth overhead for this scheme is minimal, and will be about 
0.005% derived from the fact that about 1 in every 20,000 packets 
will be marked[18]. However, the way the scheme is described, there 
is nothing to prevent an attacker from generating fake iTraces. DDoS 
attacks involve a massive amount of traffic from many different sources; 
plausible-looking fake chains could easily deceive a victim according to 
19]. If a router that marks the packets becomes subverted, it can be 
reconfigured to generate incorrect iTraces, resulting in an incorrectly 
reconstructed path[18 . 
2.3.3 Logging 
In a logging solution, we either ask routers to log the packets they pro-
cess or we augment the data packets themselves to contain a full log 
of all the routers they have encountered on their way to their destina-
tions [33]. With any of these solutions, a victim queries router or their 
storage agents to see whether they sent suspect attack packets. The 
drawback with these approaches is that they require additional storage 
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at the routers. They also require a way of publishing the data stored 
at routers in a timely manner. 
An approach belongs to the latter kind of solution is called Source 
Path Isolation Engine (SPIE) enabling the ability to identify the source 
of a particular IP packet given a copy of the packet to be traced, its 
destination, and an approximate time of receipt. One of SPIE's key 
innovations is to reduce the memory requirement (down to 0.5% of link 
bandwidth per unit time) [48]. Bloom Filters and storing only digests 
instead of full messages is the key for link bandwidth reduction. As 
packets traverse the network, digests of the packets get stored in the 
an module that they call it DGA. In this scheme, constant fields from 
the IP header and the first 8 bytes of the payload of each packet are 
hashed by several hash functions to produce several digests. Digests are 
stored in a space-efficient data structure that is called Bloom Filter, 
which reduces storage requirements by several orders of magnitude. 
When a given bloom filter is about 70 percent full, it is archived for 
later querying, and another one is used. The duration of using a single 
bloom filter is called a time period. Hash functions also change for 
different time periods [18]. SPIE [50] [51] can support traceback of 
large packet flows for longer periods of time in a fashion similar to 
probabilistic marking schemes — rather than discard packet digests as 
they expire, discard them probabilistically as they age. 
The most pressing challenges for SPIE are increasing the window 
of time in which a packet may be successfully traced and reducing the 
amount of information that must be stored for transformation handling 
48；. 
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2.3.4 Tracing Hop-by-hop 
In some cases, such as in reflector-based DDOS attacks we can use 
patterns in the attack packets to filter out DDOS packets at a firewall. 
Likewise, the approach of hop-by-hop tracing, which is also known as 
link testing, uses a pattern-based approach to do traceback of a DOS 
attack while it is in progress. 
The approach of the automated Pushback mechanism [33], for ex-
ample, is the solution currently supported manually by many router 
manufacturers. In this approach, a network administrator logs into 
the routers nearest the victim, and using statistics and pattern anal-
ysis, determines the next upstream routers in the attack tree T. The 
approach is then repeated at the upstream routers for as long as the 
attack continues. However, while under DDoS attack, controlling mes-
sages will proliferate in a fan-shape manner and cause resource usage 
to grow exponentially [56 . 
This scheme also requires immediate action during the attack, and 
requires considerable coordination between network administrators (to 
either communicate directly or setup access points for the agents of 
partnering administrators). This technique also requires some pattern-
based way to separate legitimate packets from attack packets. Because 
of its iterative nature, this approach has limited traceback capabilities 
in a large-scale DDOS. In addition, it has limited forensic appeal, since 
it can only be used while the attack is occurring. 
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2.3.5 Controlled Flooding 
A similar approach is used by Burch and Cheswick [20] to perform 
traceback by iteratively flooding from certain portions of the Internet to 
see its effects on this portion's incoming traffic. By carefully measuring 
incoming traffic to the attacked system and loading the links of the 
suspected path even more, a drop in the rates of the attack packets 
should be observed. The process can be repeated for the next hop and 
so on until the source of the attack is identified. 
However, It relies on the fact that during DoS attacks the links of 
the attack path should be heavily loaded. This assumption may not 
hold for modern backbone networks with abundant bandwidth avail-
able on the lmks[18]. The number of false positives and false negatives 
are not discussed in the literature, but obviously it would become a 
problem when the suspected attacking network is relatively large. The 
number of packets to be used as flooding traffic for the scheme to suc-
cessfully complete a traceback is considerable, which is also the cause of 
extremely high bandwidth overhead. It has the same drawback as the 
pushback method that it is incapable in very large scale DDoS attacks 
and it is only used while the attack is occurring. 
2.4 DDoS Attack Countermeasures 
There are many kinds of measures that can be used to moderate the 
effect and reduce the likelihood of DoS/DDoS attacks, including special 
configuration of network elements, improvement of Internet infrastruc-
tures and connection establishments, firewall installation, and active 
monitoring for packet filtering. However, few measures are effective 
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under DDoS attacks, and most are even vulnerable to DoS attacks 
themselves, which is why none of them can be used extensively today. 
There are some basic defensive mechanisms to augment the strength 
of a system, or increase the obstruction of offense. 
1. The basic principle in decreasing the likelihood of being attacked 
is to reduce the number of targets that can be attacked. Thus, 
stopping all unnecessary or non-essential system services or net-
work ports can be very helpful. 
2. To increase the difficulty of TCP-SYN attacks, significantly en-
larging the length of backlog queue or reducing the timeout period 
can help to cope with more simultaneous half-open connections. 
This is the simplest solution for defending against DDoS attacks. 
However, the reconfiguration may delay, or even deny, legitimate access 
as well, or lead to a potential increase in resource usage [56 . 
Installing firewall can moderate the effect of TCP SYN attacks. 
To block the arrival of potentially malicious TCP connection request 
packets at the destination hosts, a firewall can work as a TCP con-
nection request proxy that answers the request on its behalf, or as a 
TCP connection request monitor that will send a third message to the 
destination host to release its resources [46]. However, the firewall also 
introduces new problems. It will cause new delays for every connection, 
including those for legitimate users. This method assumes the firewall 
is not vulnerable to TCP SYN flooding, because it becomes the new 
target of DoS attacks. Nevertheless, even a specialized firewall can be 
disabled by a flood of 14000 packets per second, according to Moor's 
research [56 . 
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Another category of techniques is to prevent the exhaustion of the 
victim's resources is to limit the resource allocation and usage for each 
user or service. Congestion control based mechanisms are such rep-
resentatives. As most DDoS attacks incur network congestion while 
flooding the victims by large traffic, a congestion control mechanism 
should help alleviate the resources consumption suffered by normal 
traffic. Random Early Detect (RED) [28] is an approach to identify 
and preferentially drop the flows that do not obey TCP-friendly end-
to-end congestion control. Some other works, such as Fair Queueing 
25] and Class-Based Queueing (CBQ) [29] try to allocate certain avail-
able bandwidth to each flow so that they can be all served. Class Based 
Queuing configures different traffic priority queues and rules that de-
termine which packets should be put into which queue. The drawback 
with these methods is that packets or flows are unidentifiable concern-
ing whether they are attack traffic or normal traffic. 
A great deal of research focuses on how to continuously monitor 
TCP/IP traffic in a network, looking for irregularity in packet behav-
ior. If any of the attack symptoms appear, the monitor agents will react 
appropriately to moderate the effect of the attack and maintain services 
for legitimate users. The differences between these methods concern 
how to determine whether or not a packet is malicious. Once deter-
mined, monitor agents will discard suspected packets or reset pending 
connection requests [56]. The proposals to be examined in the following 
text should be able to represent a wide variety of different techniques 
on how to determine whether or not a packet is malicious. 
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2.4.1 Ingress/Egress Filtering 
Ingress/Egress filtering [27] at every ISP is recommended to prevent 
DoS attacks using IP addresses spoofed packets. This approach is 
to implement ingress and egress filtering on border routers at each 
ISP; by checking the consistency of the claimed source in each received 
message with the valid range of sources from which the router could 
receive the message, it detects messages whose claimed sources are 
modified (spoofed) and discards them. Additionally, the implemented 
ACL (access control list) at downstream interface should not accept 
addresses with internal range as the source, as this is a common spoof-
ing technique used to circumvent firewalls. On the upstream interface, 
source addresses outside of your valid range should be restricted, which 
will prevent attackers within the particular ISP network from sending 
spoofed traffic to the Internet. 
However, Ingress/Egress filtering is effective only if used in large-
scale applications. In general, routers in large backbone networks with 
complex topology cannot make a clear distinction between inbound and 
outbound traffic. Furthermore, mobile IP situations can be created in 
which legitimate addresses appear at an apparently wrong interface. 
It is still a question whether this "global security" would be practical 
in the near future since they require global cooperation; furthermore, 
messages whose claimed sources are modified between adjacent routers 
in the middle of the network will not be detected by ingress filtering. 
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2.4.2 Route-based Distributed Packet Filtering (DPF) 
A route-based distributed packet filtering (DPF) technique shares some 
similarity with Ingress filtering method by installing packet filters at 
certain amount of autonomous systems distributed in the Internet. The 
two techniques are basically distributed filtering systems relying on the 
Internet throughout deployment. At an extreme, with all autonomous 
systems and their routers implementing route-based packet filtering 
DPF method is no much different from the effect of perfect ingress 
filtering, with no spoofed IP flows being able to escape. ‘ 
In this approach [41], Park et al. proposes to use routing informa-
tion to determine if a packet arriving at a router, e.g., border router 
at an AS, is valid with respect to its claimed source/destination ad-
dresses, since a source and destination address pair should follow the 
reachability constraints imposed by routing and network topology. 
The main merit of this method as shown by their performance eval-
uation is that, with a partial coverage on at 18% of such filters equipped 
autonomous systems, significant amount of spoofed packets can already 
be dropped and the origins of those spoofed IP flows succeed reaching 
their targets can be localized to within a small, constant number of sites 
(less than 5 for Internet AS topologies). However, the cooperation of 
thousands of autonomous systems is still an unfavorable requirement, 
with every ingress/egress router of which has to install the filter. In 
addition, the effectiveness depends intimately on the connectivity struc-
ture of the underlying AS graph. Another problem with this method 
is that computing appropriate filtering tables alongside existing inter-
domain routing protocols (e.g., BGP) is a nontrivial problem due to 
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the destination-based structure of Internet routing protocols. 
2.4.3 IP Traceback Based Intelligent Packet Filtering 
Minho Sung and Jun Xu proposed a novel technique [53] for defend-
ing against Internet DDoS Attacks based on knowledge of the recon-
structed attack paths from some underlying IP traceback scheme (we 
hereafter refer to it as IP traceback based packet filtering method). A 
newly designed mark format makes it possible to identify a suspected 
packet, coming from an "infected" edge (the network edges on the at-
tack graph) and these packets are preferentially filtered out since they 
are more possibly from an attacker. 
They use some packet marking IP traceback scheme to reconstruct 
the attack graph, and call the network edges on the attack graph "in-
fected" edges. Consequently, packets marked with the "infected" edge 
markings will be preferentially filtered out, while packets from a normal 
client, on the other hand, with high probability will not be filtered out, 
since typically most of the edges on the normal path to the victim are 
not infected. They modified the underlying traceback scheme a bit for 
effective filtering effect. The marking performed by each router is di-
vided as two types: signaling is for traceback purpose as the underlying 
IP trace-back scheme requires (around 5% of total marks); the other is 
for marking packets with edge information so as to serve as the filtering 
signatures (as proposed at 95%). A defense-line with implementation 
of filters around the victim will impose rate-limit on incoming traffic 
flows based on the inscribed marks in each packet. 
However, to make sure significant amount of traffic can be filtered 
based on the second type of marks, only 5% of the marks are signaling 
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marks. This implies that the reconstruction of the whole attack graph 
will be 20 times slower than in the underlying IP traceback scheme, 
which is a considerable delay when considering the relatively short life-
time of most DDoS attacks. In addition, as the attackers become more 
distributed, the normal paths between normal clients and attack paths 
have high probability to overlap, which means an "infected" edge would 
also be traversed by a non-attack packet, especially when they near the 
victim. Anyway, this method presents an appraisable idea to integrate 
the packet filtering mechanism with IP traceback scheme. 
2.4.4 Source-end DDoS Attack Recognition and Defense 
At the same time, some researchers propose that DDoS attacks should 
be stopped as close to the sources as possible. In the work of Jelena 
Mirkovic et al. [39], a DDoS defense system called D-WARD (DDoS 
Network Attack Recognition and Defense) is proposed, which is de-
ployed at the source networks routers (stub networks or ISP networks) 
and prevents the machines from participating in DDoS attacks. As its 
name indicates, D-WARD autonomously detects and suppresses DDoS 
flows originating at this network. This system observes the outgoing 
and incoming traffic and gathers lightweight statistics on the flows, 
classified by destination. These statistics, along with built-in traffic 
models, define legitimate traffic patterns. Any discrepancy between 
observed traffic and a legitimate traffic pattern for a given destination 
is considered to be the signal of a potential DDoS attack. The source 
router then decides to throttle all traffic to the suspected target of 
the attack and at the same time attempts to separate attacking flows 
from legitimate flows and identify the attacking machines. In short, 
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D-WARD monitors two-way traffic between a set of "policed" address 
set and the rest of the Internet and compares the online traffic statis-
tics to predefined models of normal traffic, and non-complying flows 
are rate-limited. 
This approach has the benefit of preventing malicious flows from 
entering the network and consuming resources. They also plan to in-
vestigate the possibility of also deploying this system on the core routers 
in the future. 
According to their measurement for false positives, they report a 
low level of false positives, less than 0.5%. While they use the the 
number of flow and connection misclassifications (the number of times 
that any flow was misclassified as attack or suspicious, and the number 
of times that any connection was misclassified as bad) as false positives. 
Since they make use of a model of normal traffic or system behavior, 
there are two issues has to be addressed [40]: 
1. Threshold setting. Anomalies are detected when the current sys-
tem state differs from the model by a certain threshold. The 
setting of a low threshold leads to many false positives, while a 
high threshold reduces the sensitivity of the detection mechanism. 
2. Model update. Systems and communication patterns evolve with 
time, and models need to be updated to reflect this change. Anomaly-
based systems usually perform automatic model update using 
statistics gathered at a time when no attack was detected. 
Furthermore, the DDoS defense capability is confined by the limited 
attack traffic detection. 
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Table 2.1: Classification by deployment location. 
Single node Multiple collaborating nodes 
Victim end 
Victim's IP traceback based 
network packet filtering 
Intermediate Pushback 
network Ingress/Egress filtering 
Route-based DPF 
Source end D-WARD 
network 
2.4.5 Classification of DDoS Defense Methods 
The reviewed methods can be implemented on a single node or on 
multiple collaborating nodes that can be part of the victim, the victim's 
network, or the intermediate network. Table 2.2 shows the defense 
strategies according to the region they take actions. 
Only the IP traceback based packet filtering method falls into the 
category of taking act on a single node. However, this refers to the 
filtering procedure without talking about the other part of the method 
—packet marking for IP traceback. This method hereby also requires 
deployment over the Internet. The other methods involve the partici-
pation of the intermediate networks more or less. 
Based on the response strategy of DDoS defense mechanisms, we 
differentiate between preventive and reactive mechanisms. 
• The goal of preventive mechanisms is either to eliminate the possi-
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bility of DDoS attacks altogether or to enable potential victims to 
endure the attack without denying services to legitimate clients. 
• Reactive mechanisms strive to alleviate the impact of an attack 
on the victim. In order to attain this goal they need to detect the 
attack and respond to it. 
Two basic methods to relieve the impact of DDoS attacks are packet 
filtering and rate-limiting. 
• Filtering mechanisms use the characterization provided by a de-
tection mechanism to filter out the attack stream completely. Un-
less detection strategy is very reliable, filtering mechanisms run 
the risk of accidentally denying service to legitimate traffic. 
• Rate-limiting mechanisms impose a rate limit on a stream that 
has been characterized as malicious by the detection mechanism. 
Rate limiting is a lenient response technique that is usually de-
ployed when the detection mechanism has a high level of false 
positives or cannot precisely characterize the attack stream. The 
disadvantage is that they allow some attack traffic through, so ex-
tremely high scale attacks might still be effective even if all traffic 
streams are rate-limited. 
The packet filtering and rate-limiting mechanisms could address a 
specific aspect of solving the problem. While as is frequently pointed 
out, there is no "silver bullet" against DDoS attacks. In our work, 
we would defend against DDoS attacks by applying both approaches 
flexibly to solve the problem more effectively. 
• End of chapter. 
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Table 2.2: Classification by response strategy. 
Preventive mechanisms Reactive mechanism 
Filtering Ingress/Egress filtering IP traceback based 






3.1 Scheme Overview 
In this chapter, we would present a practical IP traceback approach. 
It addresses the issues concerned by both the victims and network op-
erators such as per-packet marking space limitation, network overload 
and computation overhead. 
flag = 1 dist edge 
1 bit 5 bits 16 bits 
(a) did marking field 
flag = 0 cord rid 
1 bit 14 bits 10 bits 
(b) rid marking field 
Figure 3.1: Marking fields. 
In our proposed marking algorithms, we employ 25 bits space in 
the IPv4 packet header as marking fields. Probabilistically, each par-
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ticipating router adaptively inscribes onto a traversing packet with its 
local partial path information. There are two types of markings: router 
identification (rid) marking and domain identification (did) marking. 
The rid marking is executed if the packet enters the network for the 
first time; in contrast, did marking is performed when the packet tra-
verses along the following domains towards the victim. Fig.3.1 shows 
the marking fields for domain id marking and router id marking re-
spectively. 
Two types of markings, either the router id marking or the domain 
id marking, are to be performed by a router adaptively by checking 
whether the router concerned is the ingress point of the to-be-marked 
packet or not. 
At first, however, the border routers, with implementation of our 
marking scheme should be capable of determining which type of mark-
ing to perform. Physically, these routers are connected to end-hosts 
or other routers through different interfaces; a router therefore checks 
through which interface it receives a packet to see whether a packet 
is forwarded by another router from outside the domain concerned or 
sent by an end-host at the customer side. 
The domain id marking would be performed if the router receives 
a packet routed from outside the current domain, and the router id 
marking would be performed when the packet comes from an end-host. 
Fig, 3.2 depicts the basic logic flow of the marking procedure consisting 
of two types of markings. 
The victim under a DDoS attack reconstructs the attack graph in 
two phases. First, it identifies all the intermediate domains taking part 
in forwarding the attack packets, and recovers the inter-domain attack 
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Figure 3.2: Marking algorithm flow chart with two types of markings. 
paths by inspecting the domain ids marked in the received packets. 
Second, from the router id markings in the received packets, the victim 
can identify the source routers. In general, the inter-domain attack 
paths reconstruction leads to the identification of the source domains 
(where the source router may reside), and then the identified source 
domains are associated with the router id markings to uncover the 
source routers as we wish. 
This work presents a novel design of probabilistic packet marking 
scheme at the granularity of domain, while at the same time, the attack 
sources can be identified. And this inter-domain IP traceback design 
has been proved to possess the following advantages. First, we use much 
less number of packets to identify the attack source(s). In particular, it 
requires only two uniquely marked attack packets to identify a source 
router. Second, this approach generates quite low false rates which 
will be demonstrated by the simulation results. Third, our traceback 
mechanism ensures incremental deployment and requires fewer routers 
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to participate. Actually, only the border routers need to take part in 
this traceback mechanism. 
Furthermore, keeping track of the domains traversed instead of in-
termediate routers on the attack paths and using ids instead of full 
32-bit IP addresses have some underlying advantages. First, a domain 
is an administrative unit on the Internet, which has the capability to 
conduct defenses against the attacks when it is identified to be involved 
in an attack and notified by the victim. Second, it still makes sense 
to identify the source domains even the individual source routers are 
not identified correctly. We observe that systems of some domains are 
more likely to be compromised (to launch a DDoS attack, attackers 
usually compromise a bunch of vulnerable systems as attack agents) 
due to the domains' poor security features such as weak intrusion de-
fense mechanisms and flawed security policies. 
3.2 Adaptive Packet Marking Scheme 
3.2.1 Design Motivation 
Our adaptive packet marking scheme is based on the probabilistic 
packet marking technique, but a novel IP packet marking scheme is 
proposed, which is motivated by the below issues. 
The IP traceback approaches, such as iTrace or the proposed prob-
abilistic packet marking schemes, rely on observing a high volume of 
spoofed traffic comprised of thousands or millions of packets, so the 
attacker can undermine the traceback by spreading the attack traffic 
across many attacking hosts (also referred to as agents, slaves, or re-
flectors in a reflector DDoS attack [21]), greatly increasing the amount 
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of time required by the traceback scheme to gather sufficient packets 
to analyze. Therefore, an effective traceback scheme should use as 
few packets as possible to reveal an attack path. Using a relatively 
short id instead of a full IP address, we do not need to spread a mark 
across multiple packets, and we thus feature a relatively small number 
of packets to fulfill the traceback. 
In addition, some people are challenging the necessity of the full-
path traceback solution [18]; identifying all the intermediate routers 
that the attack packets traversed, may be unattractive to the victims 
and ineffective for DoS (DDoS) countermeasures. 
• First, the full-path traceback is as good as the address of an 
ingress point in terms of identifying the attacker. 
• Second, each packet in a datagram network is individually routed 
so packets may take different routes even if their source and des-
tination are identical. 
• Third, the addressing within ISPs' networks is not necessarily 
understandable to the public since ISP may use private addressing 
plans within their own networks [18 . 
Therefore, we propose a domain based IP packet marking scheme 
to identify the intermediate domains instead of the individual routers, 
except the one serving as the attack source. 
The proposed marking scheme overloads 25 bits space in IPv4 header; 
the 25 bits space consists of the 16-bit Fragment Identification field， 
1-bit fragmentation flag and 8-bit Type of Service (ToS) field. Em-
ploying the 25 bits in the IP header for marking was first advocated by 
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Dean et al. [24]. The issue of overloading certain bits in the IP header 
would be discussed in a later section. 
As every host or router on the Internet is identified using a 32-bit 
IP address [55], it is a challenging issue to overload the 25-bit marking 
space in the IP header with a 32-bit IP address. In our proposal, we 
aim at identifying the attack paths formed by the domains and the 
source routers. To specify a domain, we do not need to use 32-bit IP 
addresses, as long as we can uniquely identify each domain with a dif-
ferent identification. The 16-bit Autonomous System Number (ASN) 
is available for this purpose; it enables us to uniquely identify up to 
(65536) domains. Meanwhile, for each domain, we assign each border 
router with a 10-bit rid] this 10-bit space should be sufficient to encode 
up to 2io (1024) border routers within a domain. 
However, to defend against the attack, the victim may demand to 
block the malicious traffic at the source routers, so the victim needs 
to retrieve the IP addresses from the ids. To obtain a border router's 
IP address based on a 10-bit rid, it takes just one table look-up. This 
could be implemented as an ID-to-IP mapping table published on web 
sites, or it could be maintained at the victims individually. In practice, 
the rid assignment and retrieval would involve a management over-
head; however, the amount of overhead is considered acceptable for 
the deployment of any marking scheme. 
3.2.2 Marking Algorithm Basics 
Our proposed marking scheme exploits the idea of probabilistic edge 
sampling [45], to mark the packets with a low probability in order to 
reduce the marking overhead of the routers. Probabilistic edge sam-
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Marking procedure at router R: 
for each packet w 
let X be a random number from [0..1) 
ii X < p then 
write R into w.start and 0 into w.distance 
else 
if w.distance = 0 then 
write R into w.end 
increment w.distance 
Path reconstruction procedure at victim V: 
let G be a tree with root V 
let edges in G be tuples (start, end, distance) 
for each packet w from attacker 
if w.distance ='0 then 
insert edge (w.start, v, 0) into G 
else 
insert edge (w.start, w.end, w.distance) into G 
remove any edge (x, y, d) with d + distance from x to V in G 
extract path {Ri..Rj ) by enumerating acyclic paths in G 
Figure 3.3: Edge sampling algorithm. 
pling is a technique commonly used by most of packet marking based 
IP traceback methods. Its main idea is to let routers probabilistically 
mark packets with partial path information during packet forwarding. 
The path information includes the IP addresses of two adjacent routers 
in an Internet map, and the distance between the victim and the router 
last marked the packet. 
Fig. 3.3 outlines the algorithm for edge sample with probabilistic 
packet marking. 
However, the edge sampling algorithm requires 72 bits of space in 
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every IP packet (two 32-bit IP addresses and 8 bits for distance to 
represent the theoretical maximum number of hops allowed using IP). 
There would not be sufficient space to append this much additional 
data to a packet in flight. Therefore, Savage et al. [45] proposed to 
encode each edge in half the space by representing it as the exclusive-
or (XOR) of the two IP addresses making up the edge, as depicted in 
Fig. 3.4. This is a basic technique to reduce the storage requirement 
is storing edges instead of endpoints. 
marking reconstruction 
丄 \ — — d 
victim 
Figure 3.4: XOR encoding technique. 
Each packet record the xor of two adjacent endpoints, thus the 
required space for two endpoints are reduced by half. When the packet 
with the xor value arrives at the victim, the victim need to decode the 
two endpoints back. The first node to be decoded is the node 1 hop 
away from the victim. As we know the IP address of victim, a, and 
one of the packet has the mark: a 0 b (suppose b is the first node 
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upstream the victim, a), the IP address of b could be decoded through 
b = (a ® b) © a. And all the nodes can be decoded in this way hop 
by hop. 
3.2.3 Domain id Marking 
The domain id marking algorithm allows the victim to infer the inter-
domain attack paths by inspecting the domain ids in the received pack-
ets. A so-called domain id (did) is to be marked along with some other 
functional fields into the packets according to the probabilistic edge 
sample algorithm described above. 
As shown by Fig. 3.1(a), there are three fields in the marking for-
mat: 16 bits "edge" field, 5 bits "dist" field and 1 bit "flag". The 
"edge" field stores one edge, made up by two endpoints encoded by 
XOR. These two endpoints may not necessarily be two routers con-
necting to each other. They are most likely two border routers that 
belong to two domains with connection between the domains instead 
of the individual routers. The "dist" field represents the number of 
hops traversed since the edge it contains is sampled. A flag is used to 
indicate whether this is a domain id marking or a router id marking. 
Basically, the domain ids of two neighboring domains are encoded 
by exclusive-or (XOR) to make up the edge, and it can be decoded back 
during reconstruction in virtue of XOR's property that a 0 6 0 a = 
b. This XOR encoding technique, used to reduce per-packet storage 
requirement is depicted in Fig. 3.4. 
Fig. 3.5 shows the domain id marking scheme. Marking probability 
p determines whether to mark a packet or not. To mark the packet, 
router R sets the distance to be zero and writes the domain id into 
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Algorithm Domain id marking by border router R 
for each packet from an upstream domain do 
generate a random number x within [0..1] 
if X < p then 
pkt.edge = did 
pkt.dist = 0 
else 
if pkt.dist is 0 then 
pkt.edge = pkt.edge 0 did 
increment pkt.dist 
Figure 3.5: Domain id marking algorithm. 
the edge field. Otherwise, if the distance is zero, router R overwrites 
the edge field with XOR of edge value present in the to-be-marked 
packet and its own id. Therefore, forming an edge between itself and 
the previous router. Whenever the packet is decided to be marked, its 
distance value would be incremented by 1. Repeatedly, this procedure 
takes place for the following domains as the packets traverse along the 
path. 
Note that the distance field is used as hop counts, and is always 
incremented. The compulsory incrementing is critical to minimize the 
spoofing of the markings by an attacker. Any packets written by the 
attacker will necessarily have a distance greater or equal to the length 
of the true attack path. Therefore, a single attacker is unable to forge 
any edge between themselves and the victim (for a distributed attack, 
of course, this applies only to the closest attacker) and the victim does 
not have to worry about "chaff" while reconstructing the valid suffix 
of the attack path [45]. We also remark that incremental deployment 
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is ensured, because we can identify a domain even if only one border 
router within that domain sees the attack packet and marks it by our 
marking scheme. 
3.2.4 Router id Marking 
The router id marking algorithm is used to identify the source routers 
that serve as ingress points of attack packets. A router performs router 
id marking with certain marking probability if it receives a packet from 
the customer side. 
As shown by Fig. 3.1(b), there are three fields in the marking 
format: 10 bits "rid" field, 14 bits "cord" field and 1 bit "flag". The 
"rid" field stores the rid if the packet is marked. The "cord" field is a 
14 bits values computed from the did of the domain that the packets 
belong to. A flag is used to indicate whether this is a domain id marking 
or a router id marking. 
Fig. 3.6 outlines the algorithm for router id marking by router R. 
A packet is either marked with rid marking of R (with higher proba-
bility) or did marking of the domain containing router R. The marking 
probability is possibly different from the one used for did marking, p; 
we denote it as q. When a packet is issued into the network for the 
. first time, the router R decides whether to mark it or not based on the 
probability q. 
To complete the inter-domain attack path, the source domain id 
should also be conveyed to the victim (Recall that we refer to the 
domain where a source router resides as source domain.); so we make 
it equally likely to mark a packet with the router id or the domain id 
at the source router. In practice, we use a larger marking probability 
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Algorithm Router id marking by router R 
for each packet pkt passing through R do 
generate a random number x within [0..1] 
generate a random number r within [0..1 
if X < q then 
if r < 0.5 then 
pkt .edge = did 
pkt. dist = 0 
pkt. flag = 1 
else 
pkt.rid 二 rid 
pkt.cord = hash(did) 
pkt. flag = 0 
Figure 3.6: Router id marking algorithm. 
q in router id marking procedure, which is double of the probability p 
that we use in domain id marking. It is like flipping a coin to decide 
to mark a packet with domain id or router id at the entry point. To 
mark a packet with a domain id, we set flag to be one and write the 
domain id into the edge field; while to mark the packet with a router 
id, we set flag to be zero and write the 10-bit router id into the rid 
field. The cord is calculated and known beforehand and is marked into 
the packet along with the rid. 
As a 10-bit router id is identifiable only within a domain; only by 
associating the rid with its corresponding source domain id, can we 
uniquely identify the source routers globally. We therefore write a 14-
bit checksum cord side by side with the rid field to associate a source 
router with its domain. The 14 bit checksum hashed from the did can 
successfully associate a rid marking with its domain if no more than 
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Algorithm Path reconstruction at victim V 
let max.d be maximum attack path length 
let G be reconstructed attack graph, initialized with vertex V 
let M be the upstream inter-domain Internet map 
let D. updid be the set of ids of the domains one hop 
upstream of domain D in M 
let D.rset be the set of source routers contained by domain D 
//Inter-domain attack graph reconstruction 
for d = 1 to max.d do 
for each node D at distance d — 1 in G do 
for each packet pkt with distance d, flag 1 do 
candidate = pkt.edge 0 D 
if candidate is in D.updid then 
insert a new edge (D, candidate) in G 
//Source router identification 
for each attack packet pkt with flag 0 do 
for each node D in G do 
if hash(D) is equal to pkt. cord then 
insert pkt.rid into D.rset 
output all the attack paths in G 
Figure 3.7: Path reconstruction algorithm at the victim. 
214(16384) source domains are involved in an attack. 
3.2.5 Attack Graph Reconstruction 
After collecting sufficient number of marked packets, the victim would 
perform attack graph reconstruction to identify the attack paths and 
the potential attack sources. Fig. 3.7 describes the reconstruction 
procedure. 
The attack graph reconstruction procedure consists of two phases. 
The first phase is inter-domain attack graph reconstruction using pack-
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ets marked with domain ids and then by the end of first stage, the 
source domains are identified. In the second phase, the algorithm relies 
on the packets with router id markings to identify the source routers. 
The inter-domain attack graph reconstruction part uses packets 
with did markings (i.e. with flag equal to 1). The packets with did 
markings are first sorted by their distance from the victim, and the 
reconstruction algorithm starts from recovering the domains one hop 
away from the victim using the did-marked packets at distance equal 
to 1: the property of XOR that a 0 / 3 0 Q； = /3 allows us to decode 
the first upstream domain (5 of the victim domain a given an attack 
packet marked with the value: a 0 / 3 and distance equal to 1. Likewise, 
an upstream domain of /3 relative to V could be decoded in the same 
manner and so forth for the entire path. Thus the domain ids on the 
attack paths are decoded hop-by-hop during inter-domain attack path 
reconstruction. 
In case of DDoS attack, there would be multiple paths in IP trace-
back, and all domain-id-marked packets at distance d, pkU, will gener-
ate a number of candidate domain ids by XORing the edge it contains 
with the ids of previously reconstructed domains at distance d — I. 
If we denote a candidate as Dij, which is decoded from pkU and the 
known endpoint of the edge is node Dj. The victim could check the 
upstream domain topology, M as a road-map to verify candidate Dij 
by checking if an edge does exist between the candidate and node Dj 
on M. We denote the set of upstream domains of domain D as D.updid, 
so the candidate is verified only if it is contained by D.updid. Node 
Dj and the verified candidate Dij would therefore make up an edge on 
the reconstructed attack path. 
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In the second phase, the algorithm relies on rid markings to identify 
the source routers. Let D.rset be the set of source routers within do-
main D. To locate the source routers with their respective domain, the 
victim first sorts the rid-maiked packets by their cord field, and then 
performs a breadth-first search from the victim, on the reconstructed 
inter-domain attack graph, level by level until it gets to the node with a 
matching checksum and adds their router ids into D.rset (it is initially 
empty and it does not include any duplicates). 
The victim thus reconstructs the attack graph that incorporates the 
identified intermediate domains and the source routers. This process 
would be completed in a quite short interval, less than 10 seconds for 
1000 distributed attackers (refer to the simulation results); so that this 
scheme enables a pretty fast response against the attacks. 
During the DDoS attacks, the packets arriving at the victim would 
include both legitimate packets and attack packets, and if the victim 
collects all the marked packets for a sufficiently long period of time, 
we may reconstruct the "traversed paths" of all the marked packets 
towards the victim. But according to probabilistic packet marking 
scheme, in a relatively short period of time (usually, the number of 
duplicates of markings is used to indicate if we have collected suffi-
cient packets for attack paths reconstruction), the majority of marked 
packets that the victim received are attack packets, so that the recon-
structed attack graph would only consist of attack paths (the presence 
of marked legitimate packets is too scarce to make up even one path). 
The reasons behind this are: 1) for IP traceback methods, only the 
flooding DDoS attacks problem is considered, which is a common as-
sumption for IP traceback methods. The attack traffic would have a 
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much higher volume than the legitimate traffic. 2) When the mark-
ing probability is low, within a short time, the victim can only collect 
sufficient attack packets to reconstruct the attack paths only. There-
fore, the attack graph reconstructed by the IP traceback scheme would 
contain only the attack paths that the attack packets traversed. 
3.2.6 IP Header Overloading 
IP Header 
Version Length Service Type Total Length 
Identification Flags Fragment Offs€t 
Time to Live Protocol Header Checksum 
Source IP Address 
Destination IP Address 
IP Options (optional) Padding 
Data 
Figure 3.8: IP header format. 
We have no choice but overloading the IP header of an IP packet, 
if we do not want the additional information add extra traffic to the 
network. Fig. 3.8 depicts the IP header and its fields. We are only 
interested in the fields that we could employ in the marking scheme. 
It is not easy to overload an IP packet header while having the 
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minimum impact on the Internet infrastructure. The fields defined in 
the IP protocol are always bearing their own purpose and function. 
The fields where the marking is to be done must be selected carefully. 
There are not perfect solution in the literature for this problem yet. 
We are actually forced to make compromises that disadvantage certain 
kind of traffic. 
The proposed marking scheme overloads 25 bits space in IPv4 header; 
the 25 bits space consists of the 16-bit Fragment Identification field, 
1-bit fragmentation flag and 8-bit Type of Service (ToS) field. Em-
ploying the 25 bits in the IP header for marking was first advocated 
by Dean et al. [24 . 
Type of Service (ToS) field. ToS field is also known as reliability 
field. ToS is used to indicate whether or not this data unit requires 
high reliability or normal service. If high reliability is indicated, it 
may be necessary to apply additional services at the upper layers 
to provide a high-reliability transmission, or it may mean that the 
data unit should not be routed over certain routes which may not 
provide a particular level of reliability. The ToS field is currently 
not set except for extreme unusual cases. 
Fragment ID field, is a 16-bit field used by IP to permit reconstruc-
tion of fragments; The identifier field is a 16-bit field used to 
correlate data unit fragments. When a data unit is fragmented, 
a number is assigned by the source to the fragments so that the 
receiver can match the IDs and reassemble the packet. The ID for 
associated fragments is the same, so the receiver can determine 
which fragments belong to each other. 
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Fragmentation flag. There is a 3-bit flag field used to qualify data 
units for fragmentation and to identify the last fragment in a 
series of fragmented data units. The first bit in the 3-bit field is 
always set to zero. The second bit is used to identify whether or 
not fragmentation is allowed for a data unit. The first bit is used 
in our marking scheme since current Internet standards simply 
require it to be zero. 
The standard does not define how ToS should be implemented 
within an internet. It is left to the network provider to determine 
how these should be implemented within its own network. The proto-
col does provide the mechanisms for various service types if network 
providers choose to use them. Nevertheless, the bits are almost always 
uninitialized. 
The Fragmentation ID field is commonly used as a marking field 
and the backward compatibility was discussed in Savage's paper [45 . 
Placing a marking in the IP Identification field of every packet in the 
network is incompatible with the current IPv4 fragmentation mecha-
nism (except under very strict network assumptions such as no packet 
reordering or loss). Despite the fact that fragmented traffic represents 
between 0.25% and 0.75% of packets in the Internet [47] [52]. The 
IP header overloading employed in the IP traceback scheme negatively 
impacts users that require fragmented IP datagrams and or desire the 
differentiated traffic. 
These problems are hardly unique to traceback and are inherent 
limitations that come about from attempting to coexist with or co-opt 
protocol features that did not anticipate a new use [45]. Researchers 
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proposed to selectively enable traceback support in response to opera-
tional needs as one possible solution to this issue. The packet marking 
is enabled in the network only if a "request" for IP traceback is broad-
casted. Since a network requesting such support is presumably already 
suffering under an attack, any minor service degradation for fragmented 
or authenticated flows would be acceptable. 
There are also some proposals on marking in the IPv6 header; how-
ever, it is not to be discussed in this work. 
3.3 Experiments on the Packet Marking Scheme 
We have performed- a good number of simulation experiments to ex-
amine the feasibility and to evaluate the performance of our proposed 
packet marking based IP traceback scheme. In this section, we present 
how the simulation experiments are carried out and depict the corre-
sponding experimental results. Various satisfactory experimental re-
sults indicate that our proposed scheme has very good performance 
and can be effectively put into practice. 
3.3.1 Simulation Set-up 
We conducted our experiments using an Internet map based on the 
traceroute dataset of the real Internet from CAIDA's Skitter Internet 
mapping project [13]; the dataset contains 178,207 distinct traceroute 
paths widely distributed over the entire Internet. The routes are all 
from a single origin to multiple hosts on the Internet. In our simula-
tions, we assume that this origin is the victim and the attackers and 
legitimate users are randomly distributed among the destination hosts 
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in the map. The attack paths are randomly chosen from the paths 
in the map. The whole traceroute dataset are used as the upstream 
topology map from the victim, which is required for the attack graph 
reconstruction. 
This traceroute has each hop as a router IP address. As we would 
conduct our simulation at a granularity of domain, we split the 32-bits 
IP address in half. For the experiments, we use the first two bytes of 
an IP address as a domain id used in the did marking based on the 
assumption that the routers sharing the same first two bytes belong to 
one domain. On the other hand, the last two bytes of an IP address 
would be processed to be used as router id which would be used in the 
router id marking. Thus we process the traceroute dataset to make it 
an Internet topology at a domain level. 
The simulation results are obtained through numerous experiments 
using IP traceback simulation programs written in C in Windows plat-
form(Pentium IV processor with speed in llOOMHz). They will be 
presented as several plots and evaluated in the later sections. Each 
data point in the plots corresponds to an average value of around 1,000 
experiment runs. Since the metrics: minimum number of packets for 
the reconstruction of an attack path of a certain length, false positives, 
number of attack sources, and attack path reconstruction time are inde-
pendent on the actual values of the parameters concerning bandwidth 
and data rates, we will use relative ratios for characterizing these pa-
rameters instead of the actual rates. 
For performance evaluation purposes, we assume that the packet 
sending rate at all attack sources is the same and the transmission rate 
along each path is constant throughout the simulations. Moreover, 
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Table 3.1: Control parameters and performance metrics used in evaluating 
IP traceback scheme. 
p Marking probability for did marking 
q Marking probability for rid marking 
Number of packets Minimum number of packets needed for the 
reconstruction of an attack path of a certain length 
False positives It refers to a router added to the reconstructed 
attack graph by the traceback mechanism, which is 
however not included in the original attack path. 
Reconstruction time The estimated time required for reconstructing 
the path back to the attackers 
there will not be any abnormal or high bandwidth traffic congesting the 
network except the flooding packets generated from the attack sources. 
3.3.2 Experimental Results and Analysis 
The experiments are performed to assess the performance of our mark-
ing scheme characterized by a number of parameters, namely the min-
imum number of packets for the reconstruction of an attack path of 
a certain length, false positives, number of attack sources, and attack 
path reconstruction time. The control parameters and performance 
metrics are listed in Table. 3.1. 
Each router on the attack paths simulates marking the packets as 
depicted in the marking algorithms. And the victim simulates applying 
the proposed reconstruction algorithm to reconstruct all the attack 
paths. 
The results are as presented in Fig. 3.9 to Fig. 3.11. Each data 
point in Fig. 3.9 to Fig. 3.11 corresponds to an average value based 
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on around 1000 experiment runs. 
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Figure 3.9: Number of packets required for attack paths reconstruction for 
different path lengths and different marking probabilities . 
Fig.3.9 shows the minimum number of packets required for the re-
construction of attack paths of different lengths and different marking 
probabilities. Since a packet will normally traverse no more than 30 
routers in the Internet to reach its destination, the attack path lengths 
considered in the experiments range from 0 to 30. In general, for each 
marking probability, the number of required packets for path recon-
struction increases linearly with the path length. For the case with 
marking probability 1%, and path length 30, the required number of 
packets would be around 400; if the marking probability is 4%, roughly 
200 packets would be required. 
When compared with other IP traceback methods, our proposed 
marking scheme requires fewer packets for reconstruction. For instance, 
for a marking probability of 4% and path length 30，scheme 2 of Ad-
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vanced Marking Schemes (AMS) with m > 5, around 1000 packets 
are required for reconstruction, where m is the number of hash func-
tions used to encode the router identification. When with m > 6, 4000 
packets are required [49 . 
Further more, by analysis, we can show the number of required 
packets could be cut by half because of our shorter path. The prob-
ability of a packet arriving at the victim site would be marked on its 
way is P = p{l — p)卜丄.p is usually assigned as 1 /dmax , where dmax 
represents the maximum number of hops on a path from attacker to 
the victim. Because ( — 1/x) is greater than exp (—1/(1 — x)). There-
fore, the probability P is at least (l/c^max) *exp {—{d — I)/{dmax — 1)), 
which, since d is less than dmax, is at least 1/e * dmax-
If we conservatively assume a partial path within each domain con-
tains two routers, a maximum domain-based path length would be 
half of its equivalent router based path length. This implies that our 
marking scheme needs to handle attack paths with average path length 
equal to one half the path lengths of those handled by other marking 
schemes. 
Moreover, we need only one marked packet to identify a domain; 
whereas other marking schemes normally employ full IP address mark-
ings for full-path reconstruction, and several packets are usually re-
quired to identify each router on an attack path. For instance, eight 
marked packets are employed in both Savage's method [45] and Song 
and Perrig's method [49] to encode each router's identity. So our mark-
ing scheme needs substantially fewer packets for attack graph recon-
struction. 
Fig. 3.10 presents the number of false positives for different num-
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Figure 3.10: False positives generated for different number of attackers. 
ber of attackers in the range 100 to 2000. It shows that our marking 
scheme generates relatively small amount of false positives. Even in 
the presence of 2000 attackers, it generated only few false positives. 
Therefore, regarding the amount of false positives generated, our 
marking scheme is comparable with scheme 2 with m > 7 of Song and 
Perrig's method [49], which also produced less than 20 false positives 
in presence of 2000 highly distributed attackers. The hash functions we 
use to encode an individual router id from the corresponding IP address 
are relatively simple, so some of the false positives could be attributed 
to the possible collisions of the hash values of the hash function em-
ployed. Had we managed to find a collision-resistant hash function for 
the experiments, the number of false positives could have been even 
smaller. 
While our marking scheme has a computation complexity of around 
Q(dn^), the method of Savage, et al. [45] and the method of Song and 
t 
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Figure 3.11: Reconstruction time for different number of attackers. 
Perrig [49] have a complexity of around and Ct(dii?) respectively, 
where d is the maximum path length and n is the number of attacking 
hosts. 
Since our domain based marking scheme involves a smaller distance 
d, its complexity is relatively small. Fig. 3.11 presents the recon-
struction times of our reconstruction algorithm for different number 
of attackers, measured on a 1500MHz Pentium IV PC platform. The 
results show that in general the attack graph reconstruction could be 
completed quite rapidly. Even for the case of 2000 attackers, it takes 
only about 80 seconds to reconstruct the attack graph, which is con-
sidered quite a fast response to a highly distributed large-scale DDoS 
attack. 
Through the simulation experiments on the proposed marking scheme, 
we observe the following: 
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(a) It requires a much smaller number of packets for attack paths re-
construction than other methods such as AMS [49]; 
(b) It can handle multiple attack sources effectively in very large scale; 
(c) The number of false positives generated even in the presence of 
2000 attack sources is relatively small; 
(d) It performs attack paths reconstruction quite rapidly and takes 
only around 50 seconds to reconstruct as many as 2000 attack paths 
on a Pentium IV PC platform (Processor llOOMHz). Thus it could 
be used to locate attack sources in real time, which is one of the 
critical steps in defending against DDoS attacks. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 4 
DDoS DEFENSE SCHEMES 
The task of identifying the actual sources of the attack packets is ad-
dressed in the last chapter. However, IP traceback techniques neither 
prevent nor stop the attack; IP traceback technique by itself has limited 
capability of sustaining the victim's service availability during a DDoS 
attack [21]. Therefore, another key task defeating a DDoS attack is 
to mitigate the attack traffic towards the victim. In this chapter, we 
focus on preserving the service availability of the victim by improv-
ing the throughput of normal traffic, so that the DDoS attacks can be 
ultimately thwarted. 
We proposed two schemes to efficiently defend against DDoS at-
tacks: packet filtering at the victim end and traffic rate-limiting at the 
source end. They are based on the packet marking scheme for IP trace-
back which enables us to detect and thus discard the attack packets 
with quite high probability in real time. 
67 
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4.1 Scheme I: Packet Filtering at Victim-end 
4.1.1 Packet Marking Scheme Modification 
In the marking scheme for IP traceback, two types of marking algo-
rithms are supported. The packets are to be marked by the rid mark-
ing or did marking, depending on whether it is at the ingress point to 
the network. We accordingly have two marking probabilities, denoted 
as p and q for did marking and rid marking respectively. 
However, the probabilistic nature of the marking algorithms are not 
compatible to the marking based packet filtering mechanism. In the 
packet filtering mechanism, each packet flowing to the victim will be 
checked against its" marking to find the malicious ones. It hence re-
quires that every packet bear a marking. We therefore modified the 
rid marking algorithm. The router would perform deterministic mark-
ing for all packets issued from its network. The did marking is the 
same as the previous proposal; a relatively small probability would be 
enough to ensure that we could infer the inter-domain attack paths. 
Fig. 4.1 shows the modified rid marking algorithm, which would be 
used in the packet marking based filtering mechanism. 
First, by marking all the packets deterministically, we ensure that 
even a spoofed marking (a packet with erroneous information injected 
by attackers) would also be overwritten with a correct marking by the 
participating routers. Second, the sources of the packets can be easily 
deduced from the rid markings. Third, marking packets at the source 
network is a better choice than leaving the processing overhead to the 
backbone routers. 
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Algorithm Router id marking revised 
for each packet pkt passing through R do 
generate a random number x within [0..1 
if X < q then 
pkt.edge = did 
pkt.dist = 0 
pkt. flag = 1 
else 
pkt.rid = rid 
pkt. cord = hash{did) 
pkt. flag = 0 
Figure 4.1: Modified router id marking algorithm for packet filtering. 
4.1.2 Packet Filtering Algorithm 
After identifying the attack source(s) through IP traceback, packet 
filtering would be carried out to alleviate the damaging effect caused by 
the DDoS attacks. And markings corresponding to the source routers 
and the nodes on the identified attack paths would serve as filtering 
signatures to instruct the packet filtering. 
A filtering agent can be deployed either on the victim machine or, 
preferably, on a dedicated machine such as firewall or gateway in front 
of the victim on the path to the victim. A set of filtering agents can also 
be deployed at the ISP's side of the last hop link, so that the attack 
packets can be filtered even before it gets to consume the victim's 
network bandwidth. Fig. 4.2 presents the packet filtering process by a 
filtering agent. It reduces the intensity of the attack by removing most 
of the attack traffic. 
Basically, a filtering agent checks if a packet is an offending packet 
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Algorithm Packet filtering algorithm 
let S represent the bitmap for rid markings 
let T represent the bitmap for did markings 
let ridf, didf be filtering probabilities for packets with rid 
markings and did markings respectively 
for each packet pkt 
if pkt contains a rid marking i then 
if (S[i] = = 1) then 
drop pkt with probability ridf 
if pkt contains a did marking j then 
if (T[jj = = 1) then 
drop pkt with probability didf 
Figure 4.2: Packet filtering algorithm. 
by examining if the inscribed markings match a filtering signature. 
With our marking scheme, a marked packet can contain either one of 
two types of markings: rid or did marking. Accordingly, the filtering 
agent would check the marking concerned against one of two bitmaps: 
either the one for did markings or the one for rid markings, which 
encode the attack graph, as shown in Fig. 4.3. 
Let S be the bitmap with each entry indexed by the rids and con-
taining one bit with binary values: it would be set to 1 if its index rid 
marking corresponds to any identified attack source, and set to 0 oth-
“ erwise. In the same manner, bitmap T encodes the set of did markings 
corresponding to the domains on attack paths. 
4.1.3 Determining the Filtering Probabilities 
The marked packets can be classified into three types: 
1. Legitimate packets with markings matching none of the attack 
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Figure 4.3: Attack graph encoded as bitmaps, 
signatures, that is, indexed to a zero value on the bitmaps. 
II. Packets with did markings matching signatures from bitmap T; 
however, it is unsure whether they are legitimate or attacking 
ones. 
III. Attack packets matching signatures from bitmap S. 
Obviously, the victim's bandwidth is for the type I packets, though 
some legitimate packets may fall into the second category. A packet 
with type II marking may also be a legitimate packet, if it is marked 
where the attack path and its path have one part overlapped. It is thus 
possible to filter packets with did markings falsely, which is referred to 
as a false drop. In addition, the victim bandwidth should be fully 
utilized so that at least some type II or type III packets can reach the 
destination and later trigger a recovery phase. The following process is 
used to decide the filtering probabilities for the three types of packets. 
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1. The legitimate traffic (bearing type I markings) at rate Ri should 
utilize the victim bandwidth without restriction; where we denote 
the victim bandwidth as wq. There is no packet filtering imposed 
on this type of traffic. 
2. For the second type of traffic (incoming at rate i?2； and Rs rep-
resents the incoming rate of the type III packets), the filtering 
probability didf will be set such that the regulated traffic rate of 
type II packets is equal to the remaining bandwidth if there is 
victim bandwidth left after the first step, as shown in Eq. 4.1. 
3. If there are still bandwidths left after step 1 and step 2, set filter-
ing probability ridf according to Eq. 4.2. 
didf — min (1, max ( + ^ — — — , 0 ) ) (4.1) 
丑2 
ridf = mm (l ,max ( ,0)) (4.2) 
丑3 
There always exists delay between the time measuring the traffic 
volume and the time performing the traffic regulation with the afore-
calculated parameters, so the algorithm shown above has to be executed 
in short enough time intervals, and the above incoming traffic rate are 
measured periodically by the filtering agents. 
The legitimate traffic throughput with varying filtering probability 
didf would be demonstrated in the simulation section. The server 
utilization improved by the algorithm will be demonstrated together 
with that of Scheme II in the simulation section. 
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In case of multiple upstream filtering agents around the victim, the 
calculations of the respective filtering probabilities will be based on 
their local parameters. The probabilities are determined the same way 
as shown above; however, the available victim bandwidth is divided a 
priori to be allocated to each upstream link. 
4.1.4 Suppressing Packets Filtering with did Markings from 
Nearby Routers 
One possible solution to reduce the number of false drops is to sup-
press filtering packets with a did marking from a nearby router. We 
notice that markings from nearby routers would more likely incur false 
drops based on the following two observations. First, as the probability 
of receiving a packet marked d hops away by the victim is (with the 
marking probability p), it is more likely that the packet has a marking 
from routers near the victim. Second, the attack graph could be gen-
erally viewed as a tree rooted from the victim, and the normal paths 
and attack paths overlap more near the victim, resulting in more false 
drops. Therefore, we let pass the packets with markings from routers 
within certain distance to the victim; and we introduce a parameter 
r to denote this distance. How r value would affect the performance 
would be presented in the experiments results section. 
4.2 Scheme II: Rate Limiting at the Sources 
Although we proposed to filter attack packets at the victim side to pro-
vide the fast relief from the overwhelming traffic for the victim, there 
are several advantages of source-end defenses over the victim-end de-
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fenses. First, attacking DDoS attacks at source-end provides better 
traffic control on the attack traffic. As not all the attack packets would 
be marked by the source routers and those marked by an intermediate 
domain may not result in a filtering decision (considering a possible 
overlapping), the filtering agents can only remove part of the attack 
traffic. Secondly, the sources should be punished directly and the net-
work re-sources are thus preserved. Thirdly, the victim may collapse 
under an extremely aggressive DDoS attack, where we can alleviate the 
traffic only at the source-ends. 
Therefore, as we have been able to trace back the sources, we pro-
pose the traffic rate-limiting mechanism as the complementary source-
end defense method to protect the victim right at the attacking sources. 
Rate-limiting the traffic is a better choice than simply dropping, since 
the victim's bandwidth can be thus best utilized. 
In this section, we would present how the attack traffic rate-limiting 
mechanism defends against DDoS attacks by mitigating the overwhelm-
ing volume of traffic issued coordinately by the distributed attacking 
sources to the victim. 
4.2.1 Algorithm of the Rate-limiting Scheme 
Fig. 4.4 describes the algorithm how we regulate the excess traffic from 
the identified attacking sources. 
With the IP traceback scheme, the victim can reconstruct the attack 
graph with knowledge of the attacking sources identified. The amount 
of traffic from each source can be estimated based on the number of 
packets received at the victim with the specific markings. Att[i] is a 
list of estimated rate from the sources and Sum_att is the estimated 
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Algorithm Rate-limiting at source-ends 
let N be the number of sources identified 
let RL[i] represent the source routers performing the traffic 
rate-limiting 
Let Att[i] be the estimated rate from the list of sources 
Let Rexcess be the excess traffic arriving at the incoming links 
Let Sum—att be the estimated rate of all attack traffic 
Let TotaLarr be the total incoming traffic rate 
Estimate the total arrival rate at the victim link 
Rexcess = TotaLarr — Vhw 
Sum.att = 0 
for i = 0 to N do 
Sum_att+ = Att\i 
/ /Note Rexcess may be larger than Sum.att 
for i = 0 to N do 
request RL[i] to drop its traffic with probability 
MIN {Rexcess I SurUMtt, 1) 
. Figure 4.4: Rate-limiting algorithm at source-ends. 
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rate of all attack traffic. The victim also needs to calculate Rexcess, 
the excess traffic arriving at the incoming links. This is the amount of 
traffic that would have to be dropped even after the victim-end packet 
filtering has taken effect. Rexcess = TotaLarr — Vbw, where TotaLarr 
is the total arrival rate of incoming traffic, including both legitimate 
and attack traffic and Vbw is the victim bandwidth. 
Att[i] 
‘=Sum-att * Re額s (4.3) 
is the amount of traffic that source i contribute to the excess traffic, 
so that source i should drop the packets with the probability of 
. i k (4.4) 
i.e., 
^excess / . j^、 
— (4.5) 
DUmMtt 
Note Rexcess Hiay be larger than Sum_att because not only the attack 
traffic but also the legitimate traffic may contribute to the amount of 
traffic exceeding the victim's capacity. If this is the case, the best we 
can help is to stop all the attacking traffic and the rest legitimate traffic 
has to compete for the limited bandwidth. 
In most cases, the computations above should be carried out by 
a gateway or firewall delegated the victim in case that the congested 
victim has run out of resources for handling these things. Obviously, 
our rate-limiting mechanism is performed with least legitimate traffic 
would be harmed. 
However, the authentication of the rate-limiting requests at the 
source domains is much of concern, since it could be abused by at-
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tackers to cause more severe service disruption. Many sophisticated 
authentication methods have been proposed in the literature [44] [34]， 
and we do not plan to discuss them here. Actually, a candidate solution 
could be Intrusion Detection Exchange Protocol and Intrusion Detec-
tion Message Exchange Format specifying the communication protocols 
and intrusion detection language [10 . 
4.3 Performance Measurements for Scheme I 
Scheme II 
A number of experiments are carried out to assess the performance of 
the proposed packet filtering mechanism and traffic rate-limiting mech-
anism. They are conducted in a simulation environment, using real-
world Internet traceroute data from CAIDA's Skitter Internet mapping 
project [13]. The dataset is composed of more than 178,000 distinct 
traceroute paths widely distributed over the entire Internet. 
The overall performance of our proposed DDoS attack defense mech-
anism obviously depends on the performance of the two constituent 
parts — adaptive packet marking scheme for IP traceback and the 
defending mechanisms. 
We presented the performance of our marking scheme in the last 
chapter. The related parameters and results will be sequentially used as 
parameters in the experiments in this work, for measuring the following 
metrics. 
The metrics for measuring the effectiveness of both the source-end 
and victim-end traffic mitigation mechanisms include Legitimate Traf-
fic Survival Ratio (LTSR), Attack Traffic Drop Ratio (ATDR), and 
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Table 4.1: Control parameters and performance metrics 
p, q Marking probability 
g The ratio of the sending rate of attacking traffic 
over the rate of legitimate traffic 
ridf , didf Probability to filter a packet with rid (did) marking 
created by a router on an attack path 
LTSR The percentage of normal packets that can make their way 
to the victim during a DDoS attack 
False drop It refers to a legitimate packet dropped falsely 
by the filtering mechanism. 
ATDR The percentage of attack traffic/packets dropped 
the number of false drops. Table.4.1 lists the control parameters and 
performance metrics. 
• First of all, we use Legitimate Traffic Survival Ratio (LTSR) to 
measure the effectiveness of packet filtering; quantitatively, it 
measures the the percentage of normal packets that can make 
their way to the victim during a DDoS attack. 
• Second, a main challenge to IP traceback based packet filtering 
scheme is the reliability of a filtering decision based on the mark-
ings inscribed in a packet. Since both attack packets and le-
gitimate packets could carry the same markings as long as they 
traverse along a common attack path, false drops are likely to be 
incurred. 
• Lastly, we define Attack Traffic Drop Ratio (ATDR) as the per-
centage of attack traffic dropped, and this ratio is desired to be 
high, ideally to be 1. 
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The simulation results are as presented in Fig. 4.5 to Fig. 4.10. 
Each data point in Fig. 4.5 to Fig. 4.10 corresponds to an average value 
based on around 1000 experiment runs. For simplifying the demon-
stration, we temporarily assume that all the Internet border routers 
participate in both the IP traceback marking scheme and they are all 
compliant to perform the rate-limiting effectively. The analysis with 
consideration of non-participating routers is to be discussed in the last 
set of experiments. 
The first set of experiments, as shown in Fig. 4.5. to Fig. 4.7， 
presents the effectiveness of the victim-end packet filtering mechanism 
with different settings. 
Since the performance metrics are independent of the actual band-
width, for simplicity, we assume the available bandwidth capacity is 
1000 units, utilized fully by 1000 normal clients if no attacks are present. 
During the attack, DDoS attack traffic would occupy 80% bandwidth 
of the total victim bandwidth and the throughput of normal traffic is 
only 20% without the filtering mechanism. 
Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.6 show that with a greater filtering probability 
for packets with did markings, more attack packets would be dropped 
and more normal packets could be preserved. When the filtering prob-
ability didf approaches 1, the attack packets drop ratio ATDR would 
also be close to 1; that is, most of the attack packets could be filtered 
(as shown in Fig. 4.6). However, even if all the attack traffic could 
be filtered, the bandwidth available for the normal traffic LTSR would 
still be below 100%. For instance, for the case of did marking proba-
bility p equal to 4%, LTSR is below 90% even when ATDR is close to 
1. This could be explained by the fact that some normal packets could 
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be filtered as false drops as the normal traffic and attack traffic may 
traverse along an overlapping subpath. 
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Figure 4.5: Plot of LTSR versus filtering probabilities for packets with did 
markings. 
The performance of the filtering mechanism, with the inclusion of 
the feature of suppressing filtering packets with did markings from 
routers close to the victim is also examined by experiments. The num-
ber of attackers considered range from 100 to 1000. The attack paths 
and the normal paths have some overlapping. 
Packets filtering suppression within distance r {r = 2,.. 4) hops 
away from victim are examined as presented in Fig. 4.7. The pack-
ets are marked with did markings with marking probability of 4%. 
The number of false drops is reduced by half when the distance is in-
creased from 2 to 4, and even more with a higher r. This feature would 
be adopted under such circumstances that we have preserved enough 
bandwidth for the normal traffic with enough attack packets removed 
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Figure 4.6: Plot of ATDR versus filtering probabilities for packets with did 
markings. 
and thus the avoidance of the false drops would be more concerned. 
However, with including this filtering suppression feature, the legit-
imate traffic survival ratio (LTSR) may become lower, if it has not 
enough bandwidth to get through, since we have to allow some attack 
traffic through. 
Another set of experiments discuss about the source-end rate-limiting 
mechanism. 
Fig. 4.8 shows how LTRS and ADTR vary as the number of the 
attackers increases, from 500 to 2000, with 500 attackers increment 
in each single experiment; at the same time, the LTRS without any 
defense responses under DDoS attacks are also shown for comparison 
purpose. 
Fig. 4.8 demonstrate that the proposed rate-limiting mechanism is 
an efficient DDoS defense mechanism with nearly 100% legitimate traf-
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Figure 4.7: Plot of number of false drops versus number of attackers if 
suppressing packets filtering r hops away from the victim. 
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Figure 4.8: Plot of LTRS and ADTR versus different number of attackers 
and plot of LTSR without DDoS defense response. 
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fic throughput and the majority of the attack traffic is removed without 
affecting legitimate traffic at all. However, when the number of attack-
ers becomes more than 1000, the IP traceback will inevitably produce 
a small number of false positives, resulting in some legitimate packets 
rate-limited, so LTSR is slightly below 100% as number of attackers 
exceeds 1000. The amount of removed attack packets, i.e., ATDR is 
determined by both the available bandwidth and the aggressiveness of 
the on-going DDoS attack; it is always no larger than enough for us to 
bring the excess traffic down to control. 
Note that for rate-limiting mechanism, the existence of path over-
lapping will not affect the parameters and results, as part of the legit-
imate packets would get marked on the overlapped sub-path but not 
marked as rid marking, so will not be counted in the sending rate, 
Att[i. 
Fig. 4.9 compares how the two defense schemes perform as well 
as the results without any defenses (which corresponds to the column 
called "Default") in terms of LTSR and victim's bandwidth utilization. 
In our testing, the simulated DDoS attack is composed of 2000 dis-
tributed attackers and 1000 legitimate users randomly selected across 
the Internet. The capacity of the victim's bandwidth is 2000 units. 
When there is no any DDoS attack defense mechanism, the victim 
suffered a lot under the simulated attack, with only 9.5% legitimate 
traffic surviving. With victim-end packets filtering alone (where we set 
the marking probability p at 4%, and the didf is set to be 1; filtering 
suppression is also applied, with r equal to 3), 91.2% legitimate traffic 
can be protected. The traffic limiting-rate scheme guarantees the op-
timal server utilization and meanwhile adequately removes the attack 
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Figure 4.9: Histograms of LTSR and bandwidth utilization without any 
DDoS defenses, with packets filtering at the victim and with the source-
ends rate-limiting mechanisms respectively. 
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traffic at the source routers. As demonstrated in the simulation results 
of the proposed IP traceback scheme, a small number of false positives 
will be produced by the underlying IP traceback scheme so there would 
be a small portion of legitimate traffic loss. 
The throughput of legitimate traffic is significantly improved either 
with packet filtering mechanism or with traffic rate-limiting. In an-
other also IP traceback based packet filtering method [53], a maximum 
legitimate traffic throughput is around 60%. Furthermore, the pro-
posed defense schemes only slightly affect any legitimate traffic, which 
is addressed as poor traffic in [49] and [45 . 
Note that the above two sets of experiments are conducted in an 
ideal environment, with all the source routers participating in and all 
compliant to perform the rate-limiting effectively. While in the real 
world, there are two kinds routers have to be considered: the non-
compliant routers and legacy routers. A non-compliant router is a 
router not willing to participate in our defense scheme, and a legacy 
router is not software router so that can not be modified to adopt our 
defense scheme. We hereafter call them non-participating routers for 
both cases. 
The effectiveness of the packets filtering mechanism with varying 
percentages of non-compliant routers in the simulation networks is 
shown in Fig. 4.10. Note that if we assume the legacy routers are 
distributed uniformly no the network, on average, there should be 
equally percentage of legacy routers among both sources ones and in-
termediate ones. The defense effectiveness decreases as the number of 
non-compliant routers increases. When the deployment of our scheme 
exceeds 50%, the results are two times better than without defenses. 
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Figure 4.10: Plot of LTSR with varying percentage of non-participating 
routers deployment. 
Therefore, there is a tradeoff between the performance improvement 
and the amount of coordination between the victim and the interme-
diate network routers. 
In summary, our simulation studies based on real-world Internet 
topologies demonstrate that the schemes are very effective in improv-
ing the throughput of legitimate traffic during DDoS attacks. The op-
erations required of routers (adaptive packets marking) are fully in line 
with the operations of IP traceback, making the schemes as practically 
deployable as possible. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis first presents a novel inter-domain based packet marking 
scheme for IP traceback. This scheme enables us to detect and thus 
to discard the attack packets with quite high probability in real time. 
We therefore make use of the packet marking scheme to develop a 
practical approach composed of packet filtering and traffic rate-limiting 
mechanism to efficiently defend against DDoS attacks. 
5.1 Contributions 
We view the contributions of this work as follows: 
• Effective DDoS defense 
- T h e adaptive packet marking scheme is an efficient IP traceback 
scheme. It can handle multiple attack sources effectively and 
can reconstruct essentially all attack paths with the presence of 
thousands of highly distributed attacking hosts. 
- P r o m the experiments results, it can be observed that the packet 
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filtering scheme and rate-limiting scheme are highly effective in 
preserving the amount of the legitimate traffic and guaranteeing 
the optimal utilization of the victim's bandwidth. 
• Innovations behind the proposals 
- T h e innovation of the adaptive packet marking scheme lies in that 
it reconstructs inter-domain attack paths and identifies attack 
sources at the same time. The identification of a source router 
and an intermediate domain are of different importance for IP 
traceback in view of the victim and this is noticed and investigated 
by us for the first time, to the best of our knowledge. 
- W e integrate the domain based packet marking scheme with the 
packet filtering scheme, filtering malicious packets according to 
the bitmaps encoded from the reconstructed attack graph. In the 
literature, there are very few proposals suggesting to use traceback 
information as filtering signatures. 
- W h e n compared to other source-end defense methods which in-
volve detecting anomaly traffic rate from the network monitored, 
the traffic rate-limiting in our scheme is performed based on the 
actual attack source information. Thus the chance of damaging 
legitimate traffic by the scheme can be minimized. 
• IP traceback performance improvements 
The performance of IP traceback schemes are commonly measured 
in terms of the minimum number of packets for the reconstruction, 
number of false positives, attack path reconstruction time and deploy-
ment overhead. The adaptive packet marking scheme is extensively 
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tested and proved to possess the following advantages compared to 
other methods: 
- I t requires a much smaller number of packets for attack paths 
reconstruction than other methods such as AMS [49] as presented 
in section 3.3.2, as it uses the relatively short id instead of a full IP 
address and keeping track of the inter-domain attack path instead 
of full path traceback; 
- I t performs attack paths reconstruction quite rapidly and takes 
only around 80 seconds to reconstruct as many as 2000 attack 
paths on a Pentium IV PC platform. It thus could be used to 
locate attack sources in real time, which is one of the critical 
steps in defending against DDoS attacks; 
- A s demonstrated in section 3.3.2, the number of false positives 
generated even in the presence of 2000 attack sources is rela-
tively small. It thus provides great reliability to be utilized by 
the packet filtering and rate-limiting mechanism to determine 
whether a packet is malicious or not. 
- A s the marking algorithms involve only the border routers and 
the overhead incurred to the routers is kept to a minimum, this 
scheme ensures a practical implementation. 
• Throughput of legitimate traffic significantly improved 
Experiment results show that the overall performance of the pro-
posed defense schemes are promising. 
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- A s demonstrated in section 4.3, with the introduction of the 
packet filtering scheme, around 80% attack packets can be suc-
cessfully removed. With an extremely strict setting of filtering 
probability for packets with did markings, almost all attack pack-
ets can be filtered out, though some normal packets could be fil-
tered as false drops as well. 
-St i l l as demonstrated in section 4.3, the throughput of normal 
traffic with the packet filtering scheme could be improved from 
20% (without filtering) to around 80%. So the service availability 
could be much improved. 
- T h e packet filtering process is of great accuracy and reliability. 
We derived different filtering probabilities to filter packets, since 
some of them are more likely to be attack packets and some may 
be "poor traffic" if they traverse the overlapped subpath of the 
attack paths. 
- A t the source end, the rate-limiting scheme has been shown in sec-
tion 4.3 to be capable of improving the throughput of legitimate 
traffic from 10% (without applying rate-limiting under DDoS at-
tack) to over 90% in an ideal environment. 
• Effective even with partial deployment 
In practice, it may not be possible to require all domain border 
routers to participate in the packet marking scheme. 
- T h e packet filtering scheme could achieve satisfactory performance 
even if there is only a partial deployment of the packet marking 
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scheme. Few of the existing proposals have addressed how the 
existence of non-compliant routers or legacy routers in the real 
world would affect their effectiveness. 
- A s demonstrated in section 4.3, when the packet filtering scheme 
involves around 50% of the routers for packet marking, the normal 
traffic throughput is at least 2 times better than the case without 
applying the defense scheme. 
To summarize, the proposed defense is innovative, effective, light-
weight, relatively easy to be deployed, and thus practical for real im-
plementation to defend against DDoS attacks. 
5.2 Discussion and Future Work 
In practice, there is little incentive for a source domain to conduct 
traffic rate-limiting, due to lack of substantial benefit for this action. 
If it can be only viewed as an alms deed, we can expect little concern 
from any ISP, especially there is risk that a traffic control may harm 
its credit to the customers [38]. So we have to discuss the deployment 
challenge of our proposed defense schemes. 
The involvement of non-victim networks is a problem commonly 
exists in the IP traceback approaches and DDoS defenses. These solu-
tions, such as Pushback approach, ingress filtering technique and etc., 
require not only router support, but also wide-spread deployment. For 
the packet filtering scheme, we do not need the coordination of the 
non-victim networks; for the rate-limiting scheme, the involvement of 
network administrations is limited to the source networks, which how-
ever has the responsibility to stop the attacking sources within its net-
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work. In addition, the sites deploying the rate-limiting scheme would 
benefit from protecting the bandwidth from illegitimate use. They do 
not have to deal with the legal implications of hosting DDoS attacking 
hosts. 
Another problem is that everyone on the Internet could claim him-
self as a DDoS attack victim. The attacker could conduct a DDoS 
attack by sending a forged request, asking the source routers to stop 
traffic to a destination. Therefore, our method is robust only if we have 
methods to guarantee that the rate-limiting request is sent exactly from 
the IP address it claims. 
In the adaptive packet marking scheme, we have included a check-
sum for associating the rids with its source domain. We view the 
checksum with potential to be used to check the integrity of markings 
in a packet. We may also make use of the checksum to authenticate 
a rate-limiting request. For instance, the authenticated marking can 
be included in the request for authentication purpose. In the near fu-
ture, we would explore this authentication potential of our proposal to 
improve the current work. This process should be simple enough to 
fulfill speed requirements and sophisticated enough to protect against 
counterfeits. Furthermore, the authentication process itself should be 
DDoS resistant. 
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